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ABSTRACT
Participatory Sensing (PS) is a new data collection paradigm in which people use their cellular phone
resources to sense and transmit data of interest to address a collective problem that would have been very
difficult to assess otherwise. Although many PS-based applications can be foreseen to solve interesting
and useful problems, many of them have not been fully implemented due to privacy concerns. As a result,
several privacy-preserving mechanisms have been proposed. This dissertation presents the state-of-the-
art of privacy-preserving mechanisms for PS systems. It includes a new taxonomy and describes the most
important issues in the design, implementation, and evaluation of privacy-preserving mechanisms. Then, the
most important mechanisms available in the literature are described, classified and qualitatively evaluated
based on design issues. The dissertation also presents a model to study the interactions between privacy-
preserving, incentive and inference mechanisms and the effects that they may have on one another, and more
importantly, on the quality of information that the system provides to the final user.
Then, a new hybrid privacy-preserving mechanism is proposed. This algorithm dynamically divides
the area of interest into cells of different sizes according to the variability of the variable of interest being
measured and chooses between two privacy-preserving mechanisms depending on the size of the cell. In
small cells, where participants can be identified easier, the algorithm uses a double-encryption technique to
protect the privacy of the participants and increase the quality of the information. In bigger cells, where
the variability of the variable of interest is low, data anonymization and obfuscation techniques are used to
protect the actual location (privacy) of the participant. The proposed mechanism is evaluated along with
other privacy-preserving mechanisms using a real PS system for air pollution monitoring. The systems are
evaluated considering the quality of information provided to the final user, energy consumption, and the
level of privacy protection. This last criterion is evaluated when the adversary is able to compromise one or
several records in the system. The experiments show the superior performance of proposed mechanism and
the existing trade-offs in terms of privacy, quality of information, and energy consumption.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Participatory Sensing (PS) is a new data collection paradigm based on the availability of millions of
cellular users equipped with smart phones and applications, Internet connectivity at all times, and a large
diversity of sensors. Given the number of cellular users, PS systems can form really large networks made
of millions of mobile sensing devices in a fast and cost-efficient manner. PS tasks deployed mobile devices
to form interactive, participatory sensor networks that enable people to gather, analyze and share local
knowledge [3]. In PS systems, cellular phone users utilize their microphones, cameras, accelerometers,
and/or other integrated/connected sensors to sense and report the data of interest [4, 5]. Moreover, using
location technologies, such as GPS, the recorded data is associated to a spatial location [6]. For example,
applications can be developed for individual users to identify and tag poisonous plants in a public park [7],
so “safe” trails can be devised for the entire community. Applications can also report traffic conditions in
real-time to provide timely reports and alternate routes to the rest of the community [8]. Another application
requires users to sense the level of pollution as they travel to build accurate pollution maps that can be used
by governmental organizations to monitor and control the amount of gases placed in the atmosphere by
some industries and by the community for many other different purposes [9]. Thus, PS has the potential to
address important and new problems and make a difference in our daily lives and society altogether.
1.1 Motivation
The main characteristic of PS is the use of many mobile and cheap sensing stations to collect data
of interest. As such, PS is limited only by the number of cellular phone users available in the region
of interest. This characteristic becomes one advantage when PS systems are compared with traditional
monitoring systems. Take a pollution monitoring system as an example: current systems are usually formed
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by few static and expensive stations located in strategic places in a city, county or state. These stations
measure and report the measurements to a central infrastructure, which uses such data to estimate the value
of the variables of interest for the entire region. However, the main restriction of this type of system is the
quality of the estimation in regions far from the monitoring stations because those estimations could be too
coarse, and in some cases imprecise [10].
On the other hand, PS systems are capable of providing data from the actual region of interest because of
the availability of mobile phones in almost every place. In this type of system, the quality of the information
presented to the final user is better than in traditional monitoring systems because the presence of actual
sensors in the region of interest. Therefore, contrary to traditional systems, PS systems are capable of
measuring, detecting, and analyzing events that occur at different spatial scales, ranging from blocks and
neighborhoods, up to counties and states.
However, as with any other new technology, PS also brings new problems and challenges that need to
be addressed if we want this new sensing paradigm to bring all the expected benefits. Among the most
important challenges, we have the following:
• Data accuracy and validity: Since sensors are supposed to be cheap and they are in the hands of
the users, the potential for less accurate and invalid sensor data due to the low precision and higher
failure rates of the sensors and invalid data due to malicious users is higher than in current system [11].
Therefore, PS needs techniques for data verification to detect and remove outliers and provide accurate
information to the final user.
• Privacy: Since participants reveal their spatio-temporal information when they submit their sensing
reports, they are making their private information available at the same time. The result is that many
PS systems will not be able to be implemented in practice because users will not be willing to par-
ticipate if their private information is not protected somehow [12]. According to [13], the problem of
sharing location information is analogous to a hospital publishing medical records to epidemiologist
and other medical researchers: it can be beneficial to society but invades on privacy.
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• Incentives: Many users will not be willing to spend their own resources, such as energy and data
plans, without getting something in return for sensing and submitting the reports [14]. Appropriate
mechanisms are needed in order to motivate users to participate in the PS system.
• Inference: Since PS applications collect huge amounts of data, more precisely, 2-dimensional data
series with gaps in time and space, PS systems need to use interpolation and inference techniques in
order to effectively fill such gaps and present appropriate results to the final users.
1.2 Problem Statement
Although several privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mechanisms are available for PS systems
that address those challenges, one important problem is that these mechanisms have been devised and studied
in an isolated or independent manner, as if they were the only mechanisms working in the system and being
applied to the reported data. However, for most PS systems, this is not a valid assumption. Actually, in
most PS systems, several of these mechanisms are supposed to be working at the same time. The problem
is that the interactions between these mechanisms and the implications that they may have in one another,
and more importantly, to the application have not been studied thus far. Using a PS called P-Sense for air
pollution monitoring [9] as an example, this dissertation performs a characterization study to understand
the interactions between these mechanisms. In particular, based on the fact that an inference mechanism is
required in order to produce useful information to the final user [15], the study seeks to find answers to the
following questions:
• What effect do privacy-preserving and incentive mechanisms have in the quality of the information
that the system provides to the final user when they work independently?
• What effect do privacy-preserving and incentive mechanisms have in the quality of the information
that the system provides to the final user when they work concurrently?
The main conclusion of the characterization is that the performance of the application is mainly driven
by the privacy-preserving mechanism. Therefore, the main question of this dissertation is: How can privacy-
preserving mechanisms be designed in order to improve the quality of the information provided to final users
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while guaranteeing a good protection level and low-energy consumption? In order to answer this question,
this dissertation performs a thorough evaluation of available privacy-preserving mechanisms to find answers
to the following research questions:
• How much do existing privacy-preserving mechanisms modify/alter the real data? What is the quality
of the information provided to the final users?
• What is the probability of locating a participant? What privacy mechanisms provide more (or less)
privacy?
• How much energy do these privacy-preserving mechanism consume?
• What kind of trade-offs or choices can we make to obtain reasonable levels of privacy, quality of
information, and energy consumption?
Based on the performance evaluation, this dissertation proposes a new hybrid and dynamic privacy-
preserving mechanism that allows the administrator of the system to tradeoff privacy, quality of information
and energy consumption according to the needs of the application.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are presented next. Each one of these contributions will be
elaborated in depth in subsequent chapters.
• A taxonomy for the classification and evaluation of privacy-preserving mechanisms for PS systems.
The first contribution of this dissertation is the presentation of the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving
mechanisms for PS systems. After a general description of PS systems and its main components,
this dissertation defines the most important issues to consider in the design, implementation, and
evaluation of privacy mechanisms. Then, a three-level taxonomy is presented for classifying the
mechanisms. The taxonomy recognizes that these mechanisms need to be applied not only to the
reporting process but to the tasking process as well, something that has not been acknowledged thus
far. Most existing taxonomies just apply to the reporting process and classify the mechanisms in a
very similar way as they are classified in the second and third level of the proposed taxonomy.
4
• A model to analyze the performance of privacy-preserving mechanisms for PS systems. The second
contribution of this dissertation is the introduction of a general model to evaluate the performance of
privacy-preserving mechanisms. The model proposes the measurement of the quality of information
to final users using the coefficient of determination (R2) , the energy consumption in Joules and the
privacy protection using the probability to be located (Ploc), when the adversary has access to a
single data record (i.e., snapshot case) [2], and the probability to be followed (Pbf ) and thePercentage
of discovered segments (Pseg) when the adversary has access to a set of records and can establish
historical correlations between them (i.e., historical case).
• Characterization of the interactions between privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mecha-
nisms in PS systems. This dissertation presents a model to study the interactions between privacy-
preserving, incentive, and inference mechanisms in participatory sensing systems. The proposed
model is applied in order to characterize the impact of these mechanisms on the quality of the infor-
mation (R2) provided by the system to the final user. The main characteristic of the proposed model
is the ability to combine and study the interaction of different mechanisms in the following scenar-
ios: 1) Privacy-preserving and inference mechanisms; 2) Incentive and inference mechanisms; and 3)
Privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mechanisms working altogether.
• A hybrid and dynamic privacy-preserving mechanism for PS systems. This dissertation proposes a
hybrid and dynamic privacy-preserving mechanism that improves the quality of information to the
final user while guaranteeing a good protection level as well as low energy consumption. The mech-
anism can be adjusted in order to tradeoff privacy, quality of information and energy consumption
according to the application needs. In addition, the performance evaluation shows that the dynamic
mechanism provides better quality of information and privacy protection to the final users without
increasing significantly the energy consumption.
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains the related work, presenting the
three-level taxonomy of privacy-preserving mechanisms along with a qualitative evaluation of them. Chap-
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ter 3 presents the characterization of the interactions between privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference
mechanisms in PS systems. Chapter 4 presents the proposed hybrid and dynamic privacy-preserving mech-
anism for PS systems along with an evaluation in terms of quality of information and energy consumption.
Chapter 5 presents the proposed model to measure privacy protection for the snapshot and historical cases
along with the performance evaluation of the proposed proposed hybrid and dynamic privacy-preserving
mechanism. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and presents possible areas of future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Location-based services (LBS) are very popular today and still growing in number of users [16–18].
For example, applications that help users to find close sites of interest such as theaters, shops, restaurants,
hospitals, malls, etc. given their current location are widely deployed and used. On the other hand, Par-
ticipatory Sensing (PS) systems are not as popular as LBS systems yet, but have the potential to address
large-scale societal problems. A typical example of a PS system involves sensing and reporting air quality
measurements to assess the pollution of a particular city, county, state, or even country. According to [19],
in participatory sensing systems users do not have a direct benefit from reporting data. Thus, participants’
temporal and spatial information should be preserved to encourage sufficient participation.
The following sections present the general concepts of PS systems as well as a proposed taxonomy to
classify the privacy-preserving mechanisms for PS followed by a qualitative evaluation of the most important
available mechanisms according to a series of design considerations. Finally, a description of open research
challenges in privacy-preserving mechanisms for PS is presented.
2.1 Participatory Sensing Systems
One of the most significant advantages of PS applications is that given the large number of existing
cellular users, they have the potential to collect data like never before and from places not economically
feasible before, and in a fast, easy, and cost-effective manner. For example, PS-based traffic congestion
applications have the potential to collect real-time data not only from main interstate roads but also from
secondary and even tertiary roads, something that is very costly using current technologies. Deploying static
sensors over all roads will be economically expensive in terms of capital and installation and maintenance
costs. Similarly, a PS-based application to measure environmental variables in a city or state will allow
7
Figure 2.1: General hardware architecture for participatory sensing systems.
the detection of abnormal levels that are nearly impossible to detect with the current static environmental
sensing stations, which rely on estimation and interpolation techniques to provide a value of the variable of
interest miles away from the station. On the other hand, since the sensing devices are in the hands of the
users, PS applications incur in very small installation and maintenance costs, and do not need to provide
energy and Internet connectivity to report the data of interest.
2.1.1 System Hardware Architecture
This section includes a general architecture for participatory sensing systems and describes its main
components.
Basically, a PS system is a wireless sensor network (WSN) with the characteristic that the sensors are
connected to mobile phones. As any other WSN, a PS application gathers data, performs a initial aggregation
and transmits such data to a central infrastructure where the data are processed in order to produce useful
information [20]. A general hardware architecture for participatory sensing systems is shown in Figure 2.1.
As shown, the architecture consists of the following four main components [6, 19, 21]:
• Sensors: These devices are used to perform the sensing task, i.e., measuring the variables of interest.
During the data collection process, these devices sample the variable or variables of interest, such as
the location of the user, images, sounds, videos, acceleration, environmental measurements, etc., and
transmit them to the second component, the mobile device. This transmission is carried out using
Bluetooth-based body area networks or similar technologies.
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• Mobile device: the mobile device is responsible for the initial data aggregation and reporting processes
of the system. These processes consist of data consolidation, report creation, and report transmission
to the central servers using the communication infrastructure. Typical mobile devices are cellular
phones, tablets, and laptops.
• Communication infrastructure: This is the communication network utilized to transport the data from
the mobile devices to the central servers. Typical networks for mobile devices include cellular data
networks and Wi-Fi networks both with connectivity to the Internet, to which the central servers are
connected to.
• Central servers: These computers are responsible for the tasking, data storage, and estimation-
inference processes. The tasking process is the first step in the sensing process and it is performed
by a data broker server, a computer that sends task requests with specific sensing instructions to each
mobile device. The other servers are used as data repositories and as application servers, running
complex algorithms to make estimations and inferences based on the reported data.
2.1.2 Protocols
In addition to the hardware components of the architecture, the functionality of participatory sensing
systems is accomplished by several protocols that allow the transmission of data from the application server
to the mobile devices and vice versa. The most important protocols are the following:
• Authentication and encryption protocols: These protocols are designed to authenticate the participants
of the system and encrypt the data. The main objective is to avoid the collection of malicious data
from unreliable sources and protect the integrity of the data. The current trend is for every participating
device to be registered to the system [22]. In some cases, such as the system presented in [21], the
system installs a participant certificate in the mobile device to authenticate the user. This certificate,
which is renovated periodically by a registration authority, is then used to encrypt and transmit the
collected data to the data broker server [22].
• Tasking protocols: These are the protocols used by the tasking process to send the task requests to the
mobile devices. Their main objective is to provide the mobile devices with the instructions for the data
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collection process. Since the system usually targets a specific region and data type, the application
server generates a sensing model that includes the target region, target sensing data, sensing time
window, reporting time window, and the sensors needed to collect the data. This model is distributed
to the participating devices using the tasking protocols during the tasking process. This distribution is
performed in some cases using a central tasking server [23–25], in a distributed fashion such as in the
work presented in [26], or in a hybrid manner using an approach like the one presented in [27].
• Reporting protocols: Once the mobile devices receive the task message, they collect data during
the reporting time window and report the data to the central servers, as defined by the application
server [28].
• Communication protocols: Participatory sensing system entities use standard Internet communication
protocols, such as the TCP/IP stack, to send and receive the data to and from the servers.
2.2 Design Considerations for Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
This section introduces those aspects that are important to consider when designing privacy-preserving
mechanisms for PS systems.
2.2.1 Type of System: Centralized or Distributed
A centralized system assumes the existence of one or more trusted entities acting as proxies for providing
privacy preservation. For example, some systems use an external entity that receives the actual value from
participants, computes a generalized value, that represents a set of participants, which is transmitted to
the participants; finally, the generalized value is reported to the application servers by participants [29].
Distributed systems, on the other hand, do not need a central entity to provide privacy. Generally, centralized
architectures are easier to manage but inherit the disadvantages of centralized architectures, i.e., single point
of failures and the fact that if the server is compromised all users can be compromised. On the other hand,
distributed architectures are harder to design, maintain, and implement but are usually more robust against
attacks.
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2.2.2 Threat Model or Types of Attacks
Privacy-preserving mechanisms can be designed to defend the participatory sensing system from the
following types of attacks:
• Snapshots and historical attacks: If the adversary is limited to capture a single report transmitted
by a participant, the system may be subject to snapshot attacks. On the other hand, if the adversary
has access to the collected data (historical data from the repository server) and is able to establish
historical correlations between different reports, the attack is called historical [30].
• Internal and external attacks: Privacy-preserving mechanisms can be designed to defend the system
against external and/or internal participant, including the possibility that a participant becomes an
adversary as well.
• Attacks exploiting knowledge of the defense: It is a common assumption in security research that
adversaries know the algorithm used for protecting the information since these algorithms are often
released to the public [31]. Therefore, if the privacy-preserving mechanism is known to everyone
and the adversary makes use of that knowledge to compromise the system, then the attack is called
def-aware. On the contrary, the attack is called def-unaware [30].
2.2.3 Information Loss
According to [32], data accuracy becomes orthogonal to security/privacy in the case of participatory
sensing applications. For instance, some privacy mechanisms generalize the actual location of the partic-
ipant to a bigger area and a larger generalization guarantees a higher level of privacy. However, from the
application view point, the reported data with the generalized location might not be good enough to provide
the intended service, making the application useless. Therefore, the system requirements should define the
maximum size of these generalized areas.
The accuracy of the systems is normally measured by the Information Loss (IL), a metric meant to
indicate how different the reported data are from the real ones. The equation below was introduced in [33]
to measure the IL in a system that distorts the real data of the users:
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IL =
∑g
j=1
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯j)2∑g
j=1
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
(2.1)
where xi is the sensed value, g is the number of groups, or number of cells in which the total area is
partitioned (1 < g), n is the number of records per group, x¯j is the average of reported values for group j
and x¯ is the average for all reported data. Normally, low IL values mean that the scheme barely distorts the
information and high values mean that the mechanism introduces a relative high level of noise.
2.2.4 Reporting Frequency
The reporting frequency is the periodicity at which the mobile device must report the sensed data to the
central servers [28]. Some systems require real-time reports while others allow for batch reporting [34]. In
this latter case, sensed data are stored in the mobile device and a batch of records is reported periodically.
Privacy-preserving mechanisms for applications that require real-time reporting must be simple in terms of
computational complexity, otherwise they will drain the battery of the mobile device very fast. PS systems
with more relaxed reporting frequencies might be able to use more complex mechanisms, such as those
based on encryption algorithms.
2.2.5 Computational Complexity
Another important design aspect is that of the computational complexity of the privacy-preserving mech-
anisms. Given the memory, energy, CPU power, and communication constraints found in mobile devices,
this design aspect is very important. This is the main reason why some complex privacy-preserving mech-
anisms are implemented in a central server, usually called the anonymizer. Simpler and less expensive
mechanisms are run directly in the mobile device at the expense of its resources, as the privacy-preserving
mechanism is designed with these constrained resources in mind.
2.2.6 Communication Overhead
In wireless sensor networks, data transmission is the most energy consuming process [35]. Therefore, it
is important to reduce the amount of transmitted data in order to reduce energy consumption in mobile de-
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vices. Consequently, privacy-preserving mechanisms should aim at not increasing the amount of transmitted
data significantly.
2.2.7 Energy Consumption
Mobile devices are usually severely constrained in terms of battery, memory, CPU power, and commu-
nication capabilities. Therefore, it is very important to design privacy-preserving mechanisms with these
constraints in mind. Battery-hungry mechanisms are usually not very appealing, as users will not be willing
to participate in the application.
2.3 Taxonomy
PS systems have associated two major processes in which the participant is involved: tasking and re-
porting processes [12]. The tasking process is used in order to task mobile devices for an specific sensing
campaign. In this process, the tasking protocols are used in order to provide the mobile devices with the
instructions for the data collection process (e.g., target region, target sensing data, sensing time window,
reporting time window, and the sensors needed to collect the data). The major privacy-related challenge
for the tasking process is that the system has to task trusty and appropriate participants without learning
participants’ sensitive data.
In the reporting process, the participants send the sensed data to the central servers. Since the reported
data contain the target data (e.g., measurements, location, time, physiological signals), an adversary may
use these data in order to identify the user and learn her sensitive data (e.g., medical condition, home ad-
dress, travel route). Therefore, each process has different privacy-protection requirements and the privacy-
preserving mechanisms must address each particular problem.
Figure 2.2 presents the three-level taxonomy used in this section to classify privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms. At the top level, privacy-preserving mechanisms are classified based on the target process: tasking or
reporting process. This is the novel aspect of this taxonomy, as it recognizes that these schemes need to be
applied not only to the reporting process but to the tasking process as well, something that has not been ac-
knowledged thus far. In the case of the tasking process, the privacy-preserving mechanisms available in the
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literature aim to avoid the association between the identity of the participant and her sensitive data through
anonymous task distribution approaches.
For the reporting process, the privacy-preserving mechanisms are classified according to whether or
not the mechanism modifies the attributes: attribute modification and non-attribute modification. Attribute
modification mechanisms aim to avoid the association between a participant and her sensitive data modifying
the actual data and reporting the modified data (e.g., the reported location is changed to a generalized value
that represents a group of participants instead of one participant). These methods are categorized in two:
anonymization-based and obfuscation-based. Anonymization-based mechanisms change the participant’s
actual data to a generalized data that represent a group of participants. Obfuscation-based mechanisms, on
the other hand, change the actual data without considering other participants.
Non-attribute modification methods normally use cryptographic techniques in order to protect partici-
pants’ sensitive data without modifying the actual value. The next sections explain the taxonomy in more
detail, describe the most important privacy-preserving mechanisms available in the literature, and evaluate
them in a qualitative manner according to the design issues presented on section 2.2.
2.4 Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for the Tasking Process
An important feature of participatory sensing systems is that mobile devices may be tasked dynamically
to make measurements in areas of interest [12]. During the tasking process, which may be repeated sev-
eral times according to the user and the system, the privacy of the user may be in jeopardy if appropriate
privacy-preserving mechanisms are not in place. For example, if the system asks certain mobile devices to
participate in a campaign in a specific region, and the participants, currently located in that region, report
their willingness to participate, then an adversary could identify the whereabouts of those participants. As
a result, most mechanisms in this category aim to guarantee the privacy of the participants avoiding the
association between their identities and their actual locations during the tasking process. Many of these
mechanisms are based on the anonymous distribution approach, in which the system does not learn the
actual location of the participants during the tasking process.
The anonymous distribution of the tasking process can be accomplished using anonymous authentica-
tion, attribute-based authentication, and tasking the users directly without revealing their locations.
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Figure 2.2: Taxonomy of privacy-preserving mechanisms for participatory sensing systems.
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2.4.1 Anonymous Authentication
In this approach, presented in [21, 36], users receive tasks through beacons without the need to reveal
their identities to the system. For example, the AnonySense system, presented in [21], periodically posts the
tasking campaign and when the participants are in public locations, locations considered by the participant
as non-sensitive ones, they download all available tasks from a tasking service. For each connection, the
participant performs an anonymous authentication, based on a group signature defined by Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA) [37], in order to prove to the system that it is a valid participant, but without revealing its
identity. Therefore, the system only learns that some participants are in public locations but nothing else,
which is the main advantage of this system. However, its main drawback is that, since the system only
learns that some users are in public locations, the system cannot predict how many users are likely to visit a
particular region and guarantee a good inference and data analysis.
Anonymous authentication schemes are distributed since there is no central entity that knows the actual
locations of the users, and protect against external and internal attacks because participants do not reveal
their locations to the system. In addition, they are classified as def-aware with low complexity and low
energy consumption since they do not require additional processing or transmission.
2.4.2 Attribute-Based Authentication
In this approach, users authenticate to the system by revealing only their attributes, such as group affili-
ation or sensor availability, but without revealing their identities [12]. The main idea is to use cryptographic
primitives to prove that they belong to a certain group without revealing their precise identity. For example,
using a group certificate, a user can prove that she satisfies the system requirements while being anonymized
to a group of participants. The main drawback of these mechanisms is associated with the size and charac-
teristics of the groups. An adversary with additional knowledge could identify the mobile device and track
the user to certain groups, allowing him to identify the precise participant.
Attribute-based systems are centralized systems. Since there is participant authentication using group
certificates, an adversary could identify a group of users that share the same attribute characteristics. How-
ever, since the user does not reveal her identity to the system, the adversary cannot identify her from the
group. Additionally, the attribute-based authentication technique avoids non-authorized or unreliable par-
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ticipants, i.e., participants that do not meet the campaign requirements such as an specific sensor from
participating in the campaign. Attribute-based schemes protect against external attacks because the system
can learn the location of a user without revealing her identity. However, an internal adversary could identify
the location of a group of participants and using external knowledge could identify them. Additionally, this
approach is classified as a def-aware method since an adversary could know that this mechanism has been
used, but he needs the encryption key in order to access the participants’ sensitive data. Finally, since it re-
quires additional processing and transmissions for authentication and encryption, this approach is considered
as having high computational complexity because it is based on cryptographic schemes. Communication
overhead and energy consumption are considered high as well.
2.4.3 Direct Tasking Without Revealing Location
This approach, applied in [38] and [39], tasks participants based on their identity, but they do not reveal
their location. [12] proposes to use anonymizing networks, such as Tor [40]. This system is a distributed
overlay network designed to anonymize TCP-based applications where each node in the path knows its
predecessor and successor, but no other nodes in the circuit, guaranteeing the privacy of the client.
Direct tasking schemes are classified as distributed because there is no a central entity knowing the
locations of the participants. Additionally, these schemes avoid non-reliable sources because they only select
the participants that meet the system requirements for the specific campaign. They protect against external
and internal attacks because participants do not reveal their locations to the system. In addition, they are
classified as def-aware methods because an adversary could know that this mechanism has been used but he
is not able to discover the participants’ sensitive data. Finally, since they do not require additional processing
or transmissions, they are considered as having low complexity, overhead, and energy consumption because
the mobile device is not required to perform additional process.
Table 2.1 summarizes the mechanisms presented in this section along with the qualitative evaluation.
2.5 Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for the Reporting Process: Attribute Modification Mechanisms
During the normal operation of the PS application, each participant transmits the sensed data to the
central servers during the reporting process. Since these applications associate the data with the time and
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Table 2.1: Summary of privacy-preserving mechanisms for the tasking process.
Approach Type of Knowledge Protection Computational Communication Energy
system of defense internal complexity overhead consumption
/external
attacks
A. Anonymous task distribution
1. Anonymous Distributed Def-aware Internal Low Low Low
authentication /External
2. Attribute-based Centralized Def-aware External High High High
authentication
3. Direct tasking without Distributed Def-aware Internal Low Low Low
revealing location /External
location of the user, the reporting process is the most privacy-sensible process in the system. An important
aspect during the reporting process is the use of quasi-identifiers. According to [41], a quasi-identifier is
defined as an attribute that can be linked to publicly available data to identify individuals (i.e., date of birth,
gender, zip code, etc.). Therefore, attribute modification mechanisms aim to transform quasi-identifiers
in such way that they cannot be used to identify a specific participant in the system. These mechanisms
are classified as anonymization- and obfuscation-based. For this and following sections, the location is
considered as the sensitive data; however, the mechanisms are extensible to other sensitive data such as
physiological signals, vehicle speed, etc.
2.5.1 Attribute Modification Mechanisms: Anonymization
These techniques aim to avoid the association between the individual and her sensitive data anonymizing
the user’s identity to a group of users. The key idea, initially developed for location-based services in [42], is
to transform the participant’s quasi-identifier value to a generalized value corresponding to a set of users [30].
Usually, the quasi-identifier corresponds to the participant’s location. The following are the most important
mechanisms in this category.
2.5.1.1 Tessellation
In this scheme each location point is enlarged to a region called a Tile, containing k users [36]. The
sensed data are reported using the tile identifiers as the sensing location. The implementation in [36] is
used in Wi-Fi networks, in which each access point (AP) keeps track of the average number of connected
devices kt. If kt < k then the cells are combined into bigger tiles in order to guarantee k-anonymity. Once
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the tiles are defined, participants report their sense data tagged to the center of the tiles instead of their
actual locations. However, due to the tile size, its main drawback is the lack of accuracy for applications
that require fine-grained location information, such as an application for monitoring traffic in highways, as
the system may not be able to identify a particular intersection. Additionally, given that APs keep track of
connected users, this scheme is only applicable for external attacks; in the case of kt < k it is possible that
an internal attack could identify a single user into a small region, violating the k-anonymity condition.
Tessellation is a centralized approach since it requires an anonymizer knowing the actual participants’
locations in order to generate the anonymized location. This approach produces a high information loss
because the tiles can be very large in order to comply with the k-anonymity requirement. It is classified as
a def-aware method since an adversary could know that this mechanism has been used, but he is not able to
discover the participants’ sensitive data. As a centralized approach, an internal adversary could get access
to the anonymizer server and the participants’ private data. The computational complexity is considered to
be low since this approach does not require any additional computation in the mobile device. However, the
communication overhead is considered as medium because the participant is required to send an additional
message to the anonymizer in order to obtain the anonymized location. Finally, the energy consumption is
considered as medium because of the additional message.
2.5.1.2 Microaggregation
Microaggregation is a k-anonymity approach that defines a set of equivalent classes of k users for protect-
ing against an adversary [33]. In this case, the sensitive attributes in the records of the k-users are changed
to an average value according to an average function. However, optimally solving microaggregation on mul-
tivariate data sets is known to be NP-hard. Therefore, approximation algorithms are used in practice [43]. A
variant of the maximum distance to average vector (VMDA) is proposed on [33, 44]; this approach consists
on defining tiles of different sizes according to the distance between the users in a particular time window,
as shown in Figure 2.3. This scheme could be implemented in a centralized fashion [33] or in a distributed
way using a peer-to-peer scheme where participants exchange location data before reporting them to the
application server [45]. The main drawback of this scheme lies in its complexity and the need to exchange
19
Figure 2.3: Example comparing Tessellation and Microaggregation approaches.
actual location with another entity, an anonymization server in the centralized case, or a set of neighbors in
the distributed case.
Figure 2.3 shows an example comparing Microaggregation and Tessellation approaches using six users
U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6. In the case of Tessellation, users U4 and U1 are anonymized to the center of
Tile 1; on the other hand, they are anonymized to Class1 using the Microaggregation approach. Given the
distance between actual and anonymized locations, the information loss is higher in Tessellation than in
Microaggregation [15]. As showed in figure 2.3, Microaggregation produces a medium level of information
loss because the VMDA provides better accuracy than Tessellation; however, it depends on the dispersion of
the users in the area of interest.
This approach is classified as a def-aware method since an adversary could know that this mechanism
is being used, but he is not able to discover the participants’ sensitive data. In the case of a centralized
system, an internal adversary could get access to the anonymizer server and obtain the participants’ private
data. Therefore, this approach is considered to protect against external adversaries. The computational com-
plexity is considered low because this approach does not require any additional computation in the mobile
device; however, the computational complexity is considered medium if done distributed. The communi-
cation overhead is considered medium since participants are required to send an additional message to the
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Table 2.2: The first stage of l-diversity after applying VMDA over the spatial dimension.
User Location Time Class Anonymized Anonymized
Id location time
U1 (2,3) 4:20 1 (2.5,3) **:**
U2 (5,6) 4:10 3 (7.5, 7.5) **:**
U3 (8,2) 4:45 2 (7, 2.5) **:**
U4 (10,9) 4:30 3 (7.5, 7.5) **:**
U5 (4,5) 4:00 1 (2.5,3) **:**
U6 (7,8) 3:50 3 (7.5, 7.5) **:**
U7 (9,2) 12:30 2 (7, 2.5) **:**
U8 (2,8) 1:50 4 (1.5, 7.5) **:**
U9 (1,1) 3:15 1 (2.5,3) **:**
U10 (5,3) 2:16 2 (7, 2.5) **:**
U11 (2,6) 7:08 4 (1.5, 7.5) **:**
U12 (1,9) 4:02 4 (1.5, 7.5) **:**
anonymizer in order to obtain the anonymized location. Finally, the energy consumption is also medium
because of the additional communication overhead.
2.5.1.3 L-Diversity
This approach, presented in [46], is a two-stage anonymization scheme which applies the VMDA at first
over the spatial dimension and then over the temporal dimension. Previous approaches assumed that the
temporal variable was anonymized using a simple technique such as adding a random value to the actual
time or changing the value to an average time window. However, this approach anonymizes the participants
to different classes in the spatial dimension and these classes are then anonymized to groups in the temporal
dimension using VMDA in both cases. Therefore, the final report sent by each user to the application server
contains the anonymized location and time and the group ID.
To define the size of each group, the authors use Group size = k ∗ L, where k means the required
k-anonymity level and l defines the level of diversity. Table 2.2 shows the first stage of l-diversity after
applying VMDA over the spatial dimension using k = 3, which defines the size of each class. Table 2.3
shows the second stage of l-diversity after applying VMDA over the temporal dimension using k = 3 and
l = 2 for the temporal dimension. Consequently, the size of each group is 3 ∗ 2 = 6. As it can be seen, the
mechanism anonymizes the location, the time, and the group Id.
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Table 2.3: The second stage of l-diversity after applying VMDA over the temporal dimension.
User Location Time Class Anonymized Anonymized Group
Id location time
U1 (2,3) 4:20 1 (2.5,3) 4:17 1
U2 (5,6) 4:10 3 (7.5, 7.5) 4:17 1
U3 (8,2) 4:45 2 (7, 2.5) 4:17 1
U4 (10,9) 4:30 3 (7.5, 7.5) 4:17 1
U5 (4,5) 4:00 1 (2.5,3) 4:17 1
U6 (7,8) 3:50 3 (7.5, 7.5) 5:08 2
U7 (9,2) 12:30 2 (7, 2.5) 5:08 2
U8 (2,8) 1:50 4 (1.5, 7.5) 5:08 2
U9 (1,1) 3:15 1 (2.5,3) 5:08 2
U10 (5,3) 2:16 2 (7, 2.5) 5:08 2
U11 (2,6) 2:08 4 (1.5, 7.5) 5:08 2
U12 (1,9) 4:02 4 (1.5, 7.5) 4:17 1
The main advantage of l-diversity is its capability for protecting against historical attacks. On the other
hand, its main drawback is the need of a proxy aware of the actual location of each user to produce the
anonymized location, time, class ID, and/or group ID. Thus, there is no guarantee that privacy will be
preserved if any user or proxy is compromised.
L-diversity works in a centralized manner since it requires an anonymizer knowing the actual locations
of the participants to generate the anonymized locations. This approach produces a medium level of in-
formation loss since the VMDA produces a better accuracy than Tessellation. L-diversity is classified as a
def-aware method since an adversary could know that this mechanism is being used, but he is not able to
discover participants’ sensitive data. Since it is a centralized approach, an internal adversary accessing the
anonymizer server could have access to participants’ private data. The computational complexity is consid-
ered to be low because this approach does not require any additional computation in the mobile device; all
the anonymization process occurs in the central anonymizer. The communication overhead is considered
medium because the participants are required to send an additional message to the anonymizer in order to
obtain the anonymized location. Finally, the energy consumption is considered medium because of the the
additional communication overhead.
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2.5.1.4 Data Aggregation
Data aggregation techniques are based on aggregation functions. According to [47], a data aggrega-
tion function is defined as y(t) ≡ f(d1(t), d2(t), , dN (t)), where di(t) is the individual sensor reading at
time t for user i. Typical functions of f include sum, average, min, max and count. The model called
Cluster-based Data Aggregation (CPDA) presented in [47], divides the network into clusters and each user
in a cluster reports the data to a leader, which reports the cluster’s aggregation to the central server. For
the transmission of the data, each node uses a pairwise shared key scheme to encrypt/decrypt data slices
transmitted to their cover node, a node that it uses to preserve its privacy. According to [48], statistical
functions (e.g., average, count, variance, standard deviation, and any other moment of the measured data)
can be reduced to the additive aggregation function sum. Therefore, [47] focus on an additive aggregation
function where f(t) =
∑N
i=1 di(t). For instance, a cluster containing three members: A, B, and C, where
a, b, and c represent the private data held by these nodes, respectively. Let A be the cluster leader of this
cluster. Then, node A calculates:
vAA = a+ r
A
1 x+ r
A
2 x
2
vAB = a+ r
A
1 y + r
A
2 y
2
vAC = a+ r
A
1 z + r
A
2 z
2
(2.2)
where x, y, z are numbers known to all nodes, rA1 and r
A
2 are two random numbers generated by node A and
known only to it. Similarly, node B and C calculate vBA , v
B
B , v
B
C and v
C
A , v
C
B , v
C
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Node B:
vBA = b+ r
B
1 x+ r
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vBB = b+ r
B
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B
1 z + r
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(2.3)
and, Node C:
vCA = c+ r
C
1 x+ r
C
2 x
2
vCB = c+ r
C
1 y + r
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vCC = c+ r
C
1 z + r
C
2 z
2
(2.4)
Then each node i encrypts the corresponding vij and sends it to each other node j. When node A receives
vBA and v
C
A , it computes FA = v
A
A +v
B
A +v
C
A = a+b+c+r1x+r2x
2, where ri = rAi +r
B
i +r
C
i . Similarly,
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when node B receives vAB and v
C
B , it computes FB = v
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2, and node C
computes FC = vAC + v
B
C + v
C
C = a+ b+ c+ r1z + r2z
2, when it receives vAC and v
B
C . Then, nodes B and
C send FB and FC to node A. Therefore, node A knows:
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(2.5)
which can be represented as:
F = GU (2.6)
where,
G =

1 x x2
1 y y2
1 z z2
 (2.7)
U =

a+ b+ c
r1
r2
 (2.8)
Therefore, node A can compute a+ b+ c from
U = G−1F (2.9)
The main problem of this approach is the computational overhead: the larger the cluster size, the
higher the computational overhead. However, a large cluster size improves privacy under node collusion
attacks [47].
Other data aggregation mechanisms use a slicing technique, like the Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)
mechanisms presented in [47]. The idea of SMART is to reduce the computational overhead at the expense
of a slightly increase in the communication overhead. SMART is based on a three-stage procedure: slicing,
mixing, and aggregation, similar to the scheme implemented in [49]. The main idea, in both cases, is that
24
each node i selects a set of n nodes called cover nodes, with n ≤ N − 1, where N the total number of
nodes in the network. Then, node i slices its data into n + 1 random slices and sends each of the n slices
to a different cover node and keeps the last slice to itself. Note that each node i can be a cover node for
other nodes in the set. Thus, each node can receives j different slices from j nodes in the network and mix
them. When it is required, each node sends the mixed data to the central node A. Finally, node A makes the
aggregation and consolidation of the data. These schemes are designed to protect against internal attacks
and rely on an encrypted transmission for protecting the system from external attackers.
In both cases, slicing and non-slicing based techniques, data aggregation works in a distributed manner
since there is no a central entity that needs to know the participants’ locations. The information loss is low
because data are not modified during the process. Data aggregation is considered def-aware because each
node can select randomly its cover nodes. Therefore, it protects against internal and external adversaries.
However, the computational complexity is considered to be high given the matrices operations. Additionally,
the communication overhead is considered high since participants need to send data to each of the other n
participants. Therefore, the energy consumption is also high.
2.5.1.5 Partial-Inclusivity and Range-Independence
This approach is based on the observation that range queries or reports sent by participants have signifi-
cant overlaps [14]. Therefore, instead of having each participant to report a separate record, only a group of
representative participant reports are sent to the server, as a consolidation of the sensed data in a particular
region [50]. This scheme is based on the cloaking of participants’ locations to a generalized region called
cloaked region. For this, each participant defines two parameters k and A, which are the minimum number
of participants in her cloaked region and the minimum area of the cloaked region, respectively. In order to
define her cloaked region, the participant communicates with her k − 1 closest neighbors and this cloaked
region is reported to the central server. Additionally, the system defines a set of DC-points, i.e., locations
from which data need to be collected. When needed, the server queries the participants containing a partic-
ular set of DC-points in their cloaked regions. Then, each participant computes her Voronoi cell and defines
her influence radius ru, which is the radius of the smallest circle that contains her Voronoi cell. This radius
ru is used to compute the representation score of each participant in the cloaked region. This score value is
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computed by the local peers in the cloaked region and the peer with the highest score is the one reporting
the data to the server. In this way, the server receives only data from one participant in the cloaked region
preserving the privacy of the participants in that region.
These schemes are distributed because they do not require of an anonymizer knowing the locations
of the participants in order to generate the anonymized location. The information loss is low because the
system reports the semantically correct data, i.e., the reported data represent correctly the actual data. It is
considered to be def-aware since an external adversary could know that this scheme is being used but he is
not able to access the actual participants’ data. This scheme has a high computational complexity because it
requires additional processing for computing the Voronoi cells and the voting process. The communication
overhead is high because each participant transmits data to each peer during the cloaked region formation
as well as for the voting process during the selection of the representative participant of the cloaked region.
2.5.1.6 Social Networks for Preserving Privacy
Social networks have also been used to preserve privacy in PS systems. These mechanisms assume
that the third-party server to which all mobile users transmit their data to may not be trusted or may be
compromised by attackers [51]. Therefore, an adversary could make the association between the sensed
data and specific participants. [51] presents a mechanism called Privacy Assurance System in Mobile Sensing
Network (PA-MSN) in which users form a social network through social interaction based on direct personal
contact or by recommendation based on common interests or location; in this latter case, the server returns
a list of subscribers and the users choose some of them to send friendship requests through the server.
Finally, the sensed data are passed to the mobile network multiple times before uploading them to the
server, anonymizing the original owner of each piece of data. Therefore, the ownership of data and location
of the participant privacy are preserved.
Approaches based on social networks are distributed since there is no a central entity that needs to
know the participants’ locations. These schemes only protect against external adversary attacks because
the participants are required to send their actual locations to other participants in the system who might be
adversaries. The information loss is low since they do not change the actual locations of the users. These
mechanisms require a significant amount of additional communication and computations since participants
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need to send the data to other participants in the system and need to process and forward incoming data from
other participants as well. Therefore, the energy consumption is also high.
2.5.2 Attribute Modification Mechanisms: Obfuscation
Obfuscation-based techniques aim to protect the association between a participant and her private data
by transforming the user’s private information, usually the participant’s location, without considering other
users’ data. The key idea is to modify the private information in such way that an adversary could not infer
the actual value. In this case, differently from the anonymization-based techniques, it is less important to
know the data of other users in order to provide privacy protection [52]. As a result, these mechanisms are
applied in the mobile devices without contacting another entity of the system.
2.5.2.1 Points of Interest
Privacy-preserving mechanisms based on Points of Interest (POI) define spatial locations where specific
information need to be captured by the system. The work presented in [32] uses a centralized scheme in
which an anonymization server (AS) receives the actual data from the mobile node in which each record
corresponds to data sensed in a POI. The AS runs a k − anonymity algorithm and reports the anonymized
data to the application server. During the anonymization process, the very first actual POI is anonymized
with any k − 1 out of remaining n − 1 POIs. The key of this approach is how to select, from the second
iteration and onwards, the k − 1 POIs that can lead to significant revelation towards the actual data of the
POIs. The solution proposed consists of a greedy algorithm that computes every combination of records
that comply with the k requirement and selects the combination with the maximum match of deduced data
against the actual one. The main problem of this approach is the high computational complexity; according
to the authors, this is a O(NN ) algorithm. To avoid the high cost, the authors proposed a division of the
area of interest into sub-regions with N ≤ 7, where N is the number of POI in each sub-region.
The work presented in [28], also defines a set of points of interest (POI) where the system needs data
from. Each POI has a influence region where the variable of interest is considered to be constant. The loca-
tion obfuscation mechanism of the system divides the area of interest into a set of regions called cells, each
one centered on a point of interest according to the requirements of the application. Then, each participant
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Figure 2.4: Example of obfuscation using Point of Interest.
receives the sensing map, consisting on the distribution of the POI. Finally, during the reporting process,
each participant modifies each record changing the actual location to the closest point of interest and reports
the modified record to the system. Figure 2.4 shows an example of obfuscation using the point-of-interest
approach. As shown in the figure, actual locations Li are changed to the closest point of interest Pj ; for
instance, locations L1 and L2 are obfuscated to P1 while L3 and L4 are obfuscated to P2.
This latter approach is classified as distributed since there is no a central entity that knows the locations
of the participants. The information loss is medium since this technique modifies the locations of the par-
ticipants according to the distribution of the points of interest. This scheme protects against external and
internal attacks because participants do not reveal their actual location to the system. The computational
complexity is considered medium because the selection of the closest point of interest for each record is per-
formed by a O(N2) algorithm. The communication overhead is low because this scheme does not require
of additional transmissions from the mobile device. Thus, the energy consumption is also considered low.
2.5.2.2 Position Sharing Approach
In this approach, presented in [53], users split up their precise position into position shares of limited
precision. The obfuscated shares are distributed among a set of location servers where each share is a vector,
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such that the concatenation of all vectors is pointing to the exact user coordinates. Therefore, a subset of
vectors gives an obfuscated position where every added refinement share should increase the precision by a
well-defined value. This approach is based on the fact that a compromised location server will only reveal
position information of strictly limited precision. In this case, the basic privacy guarantees depend on the
size of the obfuscation area obtained after the fusion of k shares; then, if an attacker knows the applied share
generation algorithm, he can derive additional information from the obtained k shares. In order to provide
privacy guarantees, the probabilistic increase of precision must be pre-estimated for any k. Consequently, an
attacker cannot derive information of higher precision that is intended by the corresponding share generation
algorithm. However, its main drawback is the significantly additional transmission overhead because the
mobile device needs to transmit each share to a different server.
Position sharing approaches are distributed since there is no a central entity knowing the actual locations
of the participants. The information loss is low because the schemes do not change the actual location of the
participants. These schemes only protect against external attacks since an internal adversary accessing all
the servers could identify a particular participant based on historical records. The computational complexity
is low because this scheme does not require significant additional processing. However, its message com-
plexity is significant since participants need to send several obfuscated shares to different servers. Therefore,
the energy consumption of this scheme is considered high.
2.5.2.3 Random Data Perturbation
This technique, proposed in [54], modifies the original data set with random noise drawn from a known
distribution. For example, a Gaussian distribution could be used to change the actual location of the user. In
the central entity of the system, the perturbed data is used to reconstruct the original distribution using an
iterative algorithm based on the Bayes Theorem [55]. In [56], the authors present a novel data perturbation
mechanism that generates a noise model with similar characteristics to the phenomenon being monitored
by the system. Then, this model is distributed to all the participants so they can generate the noise locally.
Moreover, the participants are requested to modify the configuration parameters regularly. The main draw-
back of this approach is that independent noise is insufficient to prevent adversaries from reconstructing
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the original data [57]. Further, mechanisms like the one presented in [56], which use global noise models,
require an initial knowledge about the actual data, which is not always available.
Some implementations of random data perturbation are considered distributed, as there is no central
entity knowing the locations of the participants and the generalization is performed locally in the mobile
devices. However, other implementations use an anonymizer server, which receives the actual location from
all the participants. In both cases, the information loss depends on the distribution and the parameters used
to perturb the data. On average, it is considered of a medium level because low perturbation means no
privacy and high perturbation may render useless results at the application level. Random perturbation is
classified as a def-aware method since an adversary could know that this mechanism has been used, but
he is not able to discover the sensitive data of the participants. The computational complexity is medium
because it requires additional processing in order to generate the perturbed locations. When the scheme
is implemented in a distributed fashion, it does not incur in additional communication overhead; however,
additional messages are required in the centralized approach. Therefore, the energy consumption of this
scheme is considered medium.
2.5.2.4 Negative Survey
This centralized approach, proposed in [58], guarantees the privacy of the participants ensuring that
mobile devices report fake data values, measurements that were not collected. Then, the central entity uses
these negative samples to reconstruct a histogram of the actual values. In order to accomplish this, [58]
proposed two protocols: the node and the base station protocols. The proposed approach divides the data
range into categories, each category representing a data subrange (e.g., if the system is monitoring traffic
speed, each category represents a speed range (0-9),(10-20), and so on). Then, each node runs the node
protocol, which chooses a negative data category from an array representing all the categories. This value
is then transmitted to the base station. Once the base station receives the reported data, assuming it knows
both the number of sensor nodes and the set of categories used by the nodes, it proceeds to restore the
original frequency distribution. The main drawback of this approach is that participants need to reveal their
actual locations; the scheme is rather used to anonymize environmental data such as the participants’ speed.
Therefore, an adversary could track a particular user in the system.
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The negative survey mechanism is centralized since participants reveal their actual locations to the sys-
tem. The information loss is considered low because the variable is modified by the participant reporting
a range instead of the actual value. However, the system should define the correct range size in order to
guarantee a low information loss, otherwise the information loss could reach a high level [58]. Also, an
internal adversary could infer the value of the variable for a particular user. Therefore, it is considered that
protects only against external adversaries. The computational complexity is low because this scheme does
not require additional processing in the mobile device. However, it requires of additional messages from the
mobile device to the server, then the communication overhead and the energy consumption are considered
medium.
2.6 Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for the Reporting Process: Non-Attribute Modification Mecha-
nisms
This section presents some of the most relevant privacy-preserving mechanisms that do not involve
attribute transformation. These mechanisms rely on encryption or no-encryption techniques.
2.6.1 Encryption-Based Mechanisms
Mechanisms in this category rely on cryptographic methods for data transmission and/or storage [59].
An important aspect of these mechanisms is that although running encryption algorithms is possible in
mobile devices, they are associated with high energy consumption and management issues related to key
propagation strategies [60]. The following are the most important approaches for participatory sensing.
2.6.1.1 Group Signature
The objective of group signature is to guarantee the anonymity of the users and the integrity for the
sensed data [21]. To achieve these goals, the system uses an encryption model based on group certifi-
cates. In this approach, a registration authority sends a certificate to registered users in the system.
When the user sends the sensed data, he uses the certificate for encrypting and sending the data [36].
Then, the report server receives the encrypted data but it cannot identify the actual user because of the
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group signature. In order to guarantee the integrity of the data, the report service only accepts reports
signed with the appropriated certificate; signatures do not reveal which mobile device produced them.
This is a distributed approach since there is no central entity knowing the location of the participants.
The information loss is considered low since this technique does not change the actual location of the users.
Additionally, it is considered to be def-aware since an adversary needs the key in order to decrypt the mes-
sages and access the actual data of the participants. However, an internal adversary could have access to the
participants’ data, therefore it is classified as protecting against external attacks. The computational com-
plexity of this scheme is high due to the encryption mechanism during the reporting process. Additionally,
the communication overhead is considered high because the need to establish a secure channel between
mobile devices and the report server. Thus, the energy consumption of this scheme is high.
2.6.1.2 Double Encryption
This approach, presented in [22], uses two servers: an identification proxy and an application server.
The mobile application encrypts the sensed data and uses the public key of the identification proxy to encrypt
its identification data. The ID proxy validates the signature of the sender to guarantee the integrity of the
data; however, it does not have the capability to decrypt the sensed data because the application server is
the one who has the private key for the data. Using this scheme, the system has a double protection layer
against an adversary and therefore, the probability that an adversary could compromise both the ID proxy
and the application server is very low. The tradeoff of this approach is the extra processing and transmission
overhead associated with the encryption techniques, which is significant for mobile devices.
The double encryption mechanism is considered distributed because there is no central entity knowing
the locations of the participants. The information loss is considered low since this technique does not
modify the actual locations of the users. Additionally, it is considered to be def-aware since an adversary
needs two keys in order to decrypt the messages and obtain access to the actual participants’ data. However,
a system administrator could have access to the participants’ data, so then it only protects against external
attacks. The computational complexity of this scheme is high due the encryption during the reporting
process. Additionally, the communication overhead is considered high because the need to establish a
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secure channel between mobile devices and the report server. Thus, the energy consumption of this scheme
is also high.
2.6.2 No Encryption-Based Mechanisms
This category contains privacy-preserving methods that do not change the attributes but do not make use
of cryptographic mechanisms.
2.6.2.1 Selective Sensing
These distributed techniques are based on the willingness of the participants to activate/deactivate sen-
sors [61]. According to [25], the basic implementation of this scheme is a binary one in which the sensor
is completely activated or deactivated. Therefore, the participant decides to protect her sensitive data by
not participating in the campaign when the sensor is completely deactivated. On the other hand, several
schemes allow that participants decide selectively the sensor measurement granularity depending on several
factors such as current location and time [62]. In this way, the privacy of the participant is protected, because
each participant may select what, when, and where to sense and report the sensed data to the system. The
participant can select which locations, moments, and data are considered sensitive and decide not to sense
and report these data to the system, preserving the privacy. However, their main drawback is the lack of
accuracy given the data suppression of the reports.
The information loss of selective sensing is considered high because this techniques is based on suppres-
sion, thus some valuable data may be missed. An internal adversary could infer the missing values using the
reported ones, then it only protects against external adversaries. The computational complexity is medium
because it requires additional processing for selecting the data to be transmitted. Since this scheme does not
require any extra communication from the mobile device, its communication overhead is considered low
and the energy consumption is considered low too.
2.6.2.2 Mix Networks and Zones
A mix network is a store and forward network that offers anonymous communication facilities [63].
These networks contain message routing nodes alongside mix nodes. [64] defines a mix node as a node that
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collects n equal size packets as input and reorders them before forwarding. A mix zone is defined as a
connected spatial region of maximum size in which none of a group of users has registered any application
callback. An application zone is defined as an area where a user has registered for a callback. This work
defines a middleware system for user anonymization based on mix zones. In this system, zones can be
defined a priori or calculated for a group of users. Therefore, during the reporting process, users belonging
to the same group send their messages to their application zone, then these messages are mixed across
their mixed zone preserving the privacy of the participants. However, if a mix zone has a diameter much
larger than the distance the user can cover during a location update period, the system cannot mix the users
adequately.
Mix networks and zones work in a distributed manner since there is no a central entity that knows the
locations of the users. The information loss is considered low because the locations of the participants are
not modified during the process. The adversary may know that this scheme is being applied but she needs
to intercept the transmissions of all mix nodes in order to identify a particular participant and associate her
with her sensitive data. Therefore, this scheme protects against external attacks since a system administrator
can gain access to all nodes in the mix network. The computational complexity is low because this scheme
does not require of additional processing in the mobile device. The communication overhead and the energy
consumption are both considered low for this scheme.
2.6.2.3 Path Cloaking Algorithm
This approach, presented in [34], suggests that the sampling frequency used by the participants to send
position updates should be limited to large intervals. The algorithms based on this approach suppose that
path suppression in high density areas increases the chance of confusing or mixing several different traces.
According to [65], in traffic sensing applications, paths of individual vehicles can be reconstructed from
a mix of anonymous samples belonging to several vehicles because consecutive location samples from a
vehicle exhibit temporal and spatial correlation. Therefore, these algorithms lack of privacy in low density
areas where an adversary could identify a particular participant. In order to solve that, [65] presents a
scheme based on the time to confusion metric (i.e., the time between two sample points where an adversary
could not determine the next sampling location with enough certainty from a set of records). The main idea
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is that each participant reveals her location only if the time from her previous report is less than the time
to confusion value defined by the system. For example, if a participant reports her location in a tp, then
an adversary could identify the records of that participant looking for records with a time variation of tp.
Using the time to confusion metric, the participant will report data in different time windows. Therefore, an
adversary could not identify the records of a particular participant with certainty.
Additionally, [65] presents a modification to the previous approach that provides adequate privacy guar-
antees under the reacquisition tracking model. This reacquisition model defines that an adversary skips
samples with high confusion in order to reacquire the correct trace even after a point of confusion. There-
fore, the new algorithm computes the confusionTimeout from every prior released location in addition to
the time from the last released position, then samples can only be released if all these confusion values are
above the confusion threshold. Moreover, the algorithm ensures that every sample must maintain confusion
to any samples that are released during the last γ minutes and before the confusionTimeOut was reset.
The path cloaking algorithm is centralized because it requires an anonymizer to know the locations of
the participants to determine the samples to be reported. The information loss is considered high because
this technique is based on data suppression. This scheme only protects against external attacks since an
internal adversary, with access to the anonymizer, could identify a particular participant based on historical
records. The computational complexity is low because all the processes occur in the anonymizer server and
no privacy process is performed in the mobile device. The communication overhead is low as well because
the mobile device reports their data to the anonymizer server and no additional transmissions are required.
Therefore, the energy consumption of this privacy mechanism is considered low as well.
Table 2.4 summarizes the mechanisms presented in this section along with their qualitative evaluation
according to the design considerations described in Section 2.2.
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Table 2.4: Summary of privacy-preserving mechanisms for the reporting process.
Approach Type of Information Knowledge Protection Computational Communication Energy
system loss of defense from internal complexity overhead consumption
/external attacks
Attribute modification
A. Anonymization
1. Tessellation Centralized High Def-aware External Low Medium Medium
2. Microaggregation Centralized/Distributed Medium Def-aware External Low Medium Medium
3. l-diversity Centralized Medium Def-aware External Low/Medium Medium Medium
4. Data aggregation Distributed Low Def-aware Internal/External High High High
5. Partial-inclusivity Distributed Low Def-aware External High High High
and Range-independence
6. Social networks Distributed Low Def-aware External Medium High High
for preserving privacy
B. Obfuscation
1. Points of interest Centralized/Distributed Medium Def-aware Internal/External Medium Low Low
2. Position sharing approach Distributed Low Def-aware External Medium High High
3. Random data perturbation Centralized/Distributed Medium Def-aware External Medium Medium Medium
4. Negative survey Centralized Medium Def-unaware External Low Medium Medium
No attribute modification
A. Encryption
1. Group signature Distributed Low Def-aware External High High High
2. Double Encryption Distributed Low Def-aware External High High High
B. No encryption
1. Selective sensing Distributed High Def-aware External Medium Low Low
2. Mix networks Distributed Low Def-aware External Low Low Low
3. Path cloaking algorithm Centralized High Def-aware External Low Low Low
2.7 Open Research Challenges
This section presents some of the most important open problems and challenges in privacy-preserving
mechanisms for participatory sensing.
• In privacy-preserving mechanisms for the tasking process: The main purpose of privacy-preserving
mechanisms for the tasking process is to guarantee that users can be tasked anonymously [12]. Al-
though several models have been presented, as described in Section 2.4, some methods such as the
anonymous authentication and the direct tasking without revealing location lack the capability of pre-
dicting the number of users visiting a particular region. Others, such as the ones based on attribute-
based authentication allow an adversary with additional knowledge to track the user to certain groups,
allowing the identification of a particular participant in a group. Therefore, privacy mechanisms for
the tasking process offer good privacy protection or guarantee good data quality but not both at the
same time. The challenge therefore is how to protect the participants privacy while guaranteeing a
good data quality during the tasking process.
• In privacy-preserving mechanisms for the reporting process: The main challenge associated with
the reporting process is to guarantee a good data accuracy because most applications depend on the
quality of the reported data. Since most privacy mechanisms modify the participants data in order
to protect their privacy, they introduce certain noise to the system that affects the accuracy of the
prediction/inference of the system. Based on Table 2.4, privacy-preserving mechanisms based on en-
cryption techniques offer the best data accuracy since they do not modify the data at all. However,
given the computational complexity of the encryption algorithms and the extra communication over-
head that they introduce, the applicability of these mechanisms is constrained by the limited amount
of resources available in mobile devices. The challenge is then how to guarantee a low information
loss and a low energy consumption at the same time. An example of a possible solution was presented
in [28] where a probabilistic model is used to trade off accuracy and power consumption according to
the application needs using points of interest, to reduce power consumption, and double encryption,
to increase data accuracy. However, this scheme does not consider the density of the population in the
cells of the system. For instance, if points of interest is used in low density cells, an adversary could
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easily identify a specific participant, jeopardizing her privacy. Therefore, balancing data accuracy and
energy consumption is still an important open problem.
• In the selection of the appropriate privacy-preserving mechanism: There are different criteria, meth-
ods, and metrics that can be used to evaluate the performance of privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Nonetheless, it would be good if we had a universal metric and methodology that we could use to
compare and evaluate these systems and be able to choose the most appropriate one according to
the application and users needs. This methodology should include benchmarks for the performance
evaluation of privacy mechanisms in terms of energy consumption, running time, and communication
overhead as well as probability that an adversary could identify a particular participant in the system.
2.8 Remarks
This chapter presents the state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving mechanisms for participatory sensing
systems. A three level taxonomy is presented to classify the mechanisms. In the first level, privacy-
preserving mechanisms are divided into mechanisms for the tasking or the reporting process depending
on which process they are designed to work on. The main characteristic of privacy mechanisms for the
tasking process is the anonymous tasking or tasking the participants without revealing their location or iden-
tity. On the other hand, the mechanisms for the reporting process are divided into attribute modification and
non-attribute modification mechanisms depending on whether they modify or not the attribute to protect. In
the first case, privacy mechanisms modify the actual data via anonymization in which the participants’ data
are generalized to a group of users, or obfuscation, in which the participants’ data are modified without con-
sidering the data from other participants. In non-attribute modification schemes, the participants privacy is
preserved using encryption or no encryption techniques such as selective sensing, in which the participants
decide what/where/when to report the data to the system.
In addition, this chapter includes a qualitative evaluation of the mechanisms based on several metrics
and important aspects, such as the threat model, information loss, computational complexity, communication
overhead, and energy consumption associated with each mechanism. The main conclusion is the orthogonal
relationship between data quality, privacy, and resource consumption since privacy mechanisms with a good
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quality performance and low information loss, such as encryption based techniques, demand a high amount
of resources, which are limited on mobile devices.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVACY, INCENTIVE AND INFERENCE MECHANISMS
3.1 Note to the Reader
Part of this chapter was published in the Lecture Notes in Computer Science by Springer [15]. Appendix
A includes the permissions to reuse such work in this dissertation.
3.2 Introduction
Participatory Sensing (PS) has the potential to address important and new problems and make a differ-
ence in our daily lives and society altogether. However, while some applications provide a direct benefit to
the users, like the example about the poisonous plants, others rather ask the user to collect and send the data
to a service provider without any tangible benefit. In these cases, the users will not be willing to participate,
as they will incur in certain costs that might not be willing to assume. For example, users might not be
willing to participate in the pollution system if they also have to spend their data plans and batteries without
any direct benefit in return. Therefore, for some PS systems, incentive mechanisms need to be included to
guarantee a minimum level of participation for the system to be able to actually work.
Although there are several privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mechanisms for PS systems
available in the literature that have been developed to address these issues and make PS a viable data collec-
tion paradigm in practice, one important problem is that these mechanisms have been devised and studied in
an isolated or independent manner, as if they were the only mechanisms working in the system. However,
for most PS systems, this is not a valid assumption. For example, most privacy-preserving mechanisms re-
port a fake location to the system to protect the privacy of the user as presented in Chapter 2; but if this new
location is very far away from the real one, the application may not work as expected or may present wrong
results to the final user, such as reporting a pollution value in a location that corresponds to a completely
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Figure 3.1: System model and performance metrics.
different one. Also, these fake locations might be the ones being used by the incentive mechanism, which
may end up buying wrong samples thinking that these samples were taken from those locations when in
reality they correspond to different places. This chapter presents a characterization of the relations between
privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mechanisms.
3.3 Data Processing Model
In order to study the interactions and effects of the privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mech-
anisms in the PS system, the model and performance metrics depicted in Figure 3.1 were used in this
work. The model consists of four components: Sensed Data, Privacy Mechanism, Incentive Mechanism
and Inference Engine. The sense data component corresponds to the data reported by the participants of
the PS application and is used as the input to the other components of the system. The second component,
the privacy mechanism, receives sensed data and produces modified data according to the selected privacy
mechanism. The third component, the incentive mechanism, selects a subset of the input data according to
the incentive mechanism implemented in the system. The last component, the inference engine, is used to
produce estimations of the selected variables in the areas of interest.
The model is general, as it allows for the study of PS systems that implement all these components or
just a subset of them. Accordingly, the proposed model includes several data paths which are the following:
• First data path: Neither privacy nor incentive mechanisms. This data path applies to those systems
that implement neither privacy-preserving nor incentive mechanisms. In this case, the sensed data
is fed directly to the inference engine in order to obtain an estimation of the variables in the area of
interest.
• Second data path: Privacy but not incentive mechanism. This data path considers a system that imple-
ments a privacy-preserving mechanism. Here, sensed data are fed directly to the privacy mechanism,
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which produces the modified data. The modified data is then used as the input to the inference engine
in order to obtain the estimation of the variable in the area of interest.
• Third data path: Incentive but not privacy mechanism. This path considers a system that does not
implement a privacy-preserving mechanism but it does include an incentive mechanism. In this case,
sense data are fed directly to the inference engine in order to obtain an estimation of the variables of
interest.
• Fourth path: Privacy and incentive mechanisms. Finally, this path considers a system that implements
all components. Here, the data modified by the privacy mechanism is fed to the incentive mechanism
and then, the selected samples are used as the input data to the inference engine.
3.4 Performance Metrics
In order to assess the performance of the system, the selected performance metrics are the quality of the
estimation (R2), the average displacement and the area coverage (C).
3.4.1 Quality of Information (R2)
The quality of information is given by the coefficient of determination (R2), which is defined as:
R2 = 1−
∑
i(yi − fi)2∑
i(yi − y¯)2
(3.1)
where yi are the known values, fi are the interpolated values using the values modified by the privacy mech-
anism, and y¯ is the mean of the known data. Therefore, the quality of information R2 provides a measure
of how different the real data and the estimations are. By calculating the coefficient of determination, the
effect of the privacy mechanisms in the quality of the final interpolations can be measured [10].
3.4.2 Average Displacement (D)
The second metric measures the average displacement that the privacy-preserving mechanism produces
as a result of changing the original location of the participant by the anonymization, obfuscation, or encryp-
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tion mechanisms. Average displacement is defined as:
D =
∑N
i=1 |yi − fi|
N
(3.2)
where yi is the actual location of the i participant, fi is the reported location by the privacy-preserving
mechanism, and N is the number of participants in the system.
Average displacement has significance for anonymization and obfuscation techniques, as encryption-
based techniques do not change the real locations of the users but preserve their privacy by other means.
Further, it is worth noticing the tradeoff here. While a large displacement means good privacy protection,
it also means that it may render the application useless. In the case of the pollution application example
considered in this work, a very large displacement means that one sample taken from a very polluted area
may be reported in a very clean location!
3.4.3 Area Coverage (C)
The third metric is related to the incentive mechanism and measures the coverage of the area of interest
C after the incentive mechanism is applied using as input data the real sensed data, as reported by the users,
or the modified data, as generated by the privacy-preserving mechanism [14]. The coverage metric is defined
as follows:
C =
∑
iAi
Total area
(3.3)
where Ai corresponds to the area covered by the i participant and Total area corresponds to the total area
of interest.
3.5 Related Work on Incentive and Inference Mechanisms
This section presents the related work on incentive and inference mechanisms to this dissertation.
3.5.1 Incentive Mechanisms
According to [14], users might not be willing to use their resources and participate unless they receive
something in return. Therefore, several incentive mechanisms have been proposed to increase users’ par-
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ticipation in the system. Most of these mechanisms are based on reverse auction techniques. For instance,
in the Reverse auction based dynamic price scheme (RADP-VPC-RC) presented in [66], each user makes a
bid offering her sensed data and the system buys the k cheapest ones. Further, RADP-VPC-RC also tackles
the problem of cost explosion and avoids users from dropping out of the system. However, one important
drawback of this approach is the collection of redundant (not valuable) data, as the k cheapest samples might
be very close to one another. The work presented in [14] extends this approach with the Greedy Incentive
Algorithm (GIA), which uses not only the price but also the locations of the users for choosing the samples
to buy. Using the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage Algorithm (GBMC), GIA considers the location of
the users, the coverage, and the budget constraints of the auctioneer. The key idea is to buy the k cheapest
samples that maximize the covered area. Thus, GIA buys k units in increasing order of cost in such way that
it avoids buying samples that are closely located. An interesting result reported in [14] indicates that GIA
reaches a significantly better coverage of the region of interest than RADP-VPC-RC.
3.5.2 Inference Mechanisms
Inference techniques are utilized in PS systems to estimate the variables of interest in those places
where data are not available. In this area, Kriging is one of the most widely used techniques in geostatistics
(a branch of statistics that focuses on spatio-temporal datasets). Kriging is a BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased
Estimator) interpolator, i.e., it is a linear estimator that matches the correct expected value of the population
(unbiased) while minimizing the variance of the observations (Best) [67, 68]. All the different variations of
the Kriging estimator are modified versions of the best linear regression estimator:
Z∗(u)−m(u) =
N∑
i=1
λi(Z(ui)−m(ui)) (3.4)
where u and ui are location vectors, N is the number of data points used in the process of estimating Z∗(u),
m(u) and m(ui) are the means of Z(u) and Z(ui), and λi are the Kriging weights for estimating at location
u. These weights are determined to minimize the variance of the estimator using a stochastic model of the
spatial dependence quantified by the semivariogram γ(h) (h defines the lag distance between two points).
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In order to calculate a robust experimental semivariogram γ¯(h), the work in [69] defines:
2γ¯(h) =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Z(ui)− Z(uj)|1/2
)4
/(0.457 + 0.494/N) (3.5)
Given this experimental semivariogram, these values need to be fitted to a theoretical model, the spher-
ical, Gaussian, and exponential being the most commonly used ones. For the dataset utilized, the spherical
model was used. Nevertheless, the use of any of the other two models will not change the methods pre-
sented here, but just the fitting process of the semivariogram. For the semivariograms, it is assumed that
the variability of the variable does not depend on the direction in the space (isotropic semivariograms). We
implemented a software application to automate the entire interpolation process. The application generates
the experimental semivariogram, fits the values to the spherical model, and makes use of mGstat [70] to
calculate the interpolated data by using three different types of Kriging, simple, ordinary, and trend. The use
of Kriging using trends leads to the best results.
3.6 P-Sense: A PS System for Pollution Monitoring and Control
In order to use real environmental data using a PS approach, this dissertation utilized the P-Sense system
described in [9], as the participatory sensing collection system. P-Sense is a PS system for air pollution
monitoring and control. P-Sense provides large amounts of pollution data in time and space with different
granularities in a simple and cost-effective manner as shown in figure 3.2. In P-Sense, sensors are integrated
using a Bluetooth capable board, which then transmits the collected measurements to a first-level integrator
device, in this case an Android cellular phone with GPS and Bluetooth capabilities. P-Sense measures CO
(ppm), CO2 (ppm), combustible gases (ppm), air quality (4 discrete levels), temperature (F), and relative
humidity (%), through the integration of the following external sensors:
• The Arduino BT development board [71]: a Bluetooth-capable AVR based board that integrates digital
and analog sensors.
• Gas sensors by Figaro Sensors [72]: carbon dioxide (CDM4161), combustible gas (FCM6812), car-
bon monoxide (TGS 5042), and air quality (AM 1-2602).
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Figure 3.2: Example of estimated variable of interest using P-Sense [1].
• Temperature and relative humidity sensor by Sensirion [73]: SHT-75 digital sensor.
The first-level integrator collects the measurements coming from the sensor board and uses the appropri-
ate privacy-preserving mechanism to send the data to the application server where most of the processing is
done. Nevertheless, the first-level integrator implements features like local visualization of collected values
in real time.
3.7 Experiments and Results
This section presents the experimental setting and results obtained for each of the data paths defined
above.
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3.7.1 Experimental Setting
In order to collect real environmental data using a PS approach, the P-Sense system described in Sec-
tion 3.6 was used. The campus of the University of South Florida, in Tampa, Florida was the location for
the collection of the data. The used area of the campus is approximately 3.9 km2, which is represented
using a grid of 105x105 units squares in this work, i.e., each unit square is equivalent to 353 m2. During
three months data were collected 3 times a day for one hour, 3 to 4 days a week. The dataset corresponds
to a sample of the data collected during one hour on a randomly chosen day. Nevertheless, the training of
the parameters presented in this work was done in different sets for different days of the week and hours of
the day simulating 60 participants. Finally, the inference engine is based on a spatial interpolation using a
multivariate approach with the combination of the widely-known Kriging technique [11].
The most widely known privacy-preserving mechanisms were implemented with the following values:
• Tessellation: This mechanism was implemented varying the k parameter from 3 to 9. Additionally,
tiles were constructed using x− axis order, meaning that locations were ordered based on x− axis
location and the tiles were as big as necessary to contain k participants depending on its value.
• Points of Interest: This mechanism was implemented dividing the area of interest using a grid. Dif-
ferent grids sizes were used from 4x4 up to 11x11 cells. Recall that each point of interest is located at
the center of each cell, therefore, fewer points of interest mean larger cells.
• Random Perturbation: This mechanism was implemented using three random distributions for the
displacement of the actual locations in each axis: uniform, Gaussian, and exponential. In the case of
the uniform distribution, the parameters were {[1,5],[5,15] and [10,20]}. In the case of the normal
distribution, the parameters were {[µ = 5, σ = 1], [µ = 10, σ = 1], [µ = 10, σ = 3], [µ = 15, σ =
1], [µ = 15, σ = 3], [µ = 15, σ = 5], [µ = 20, σ = 1], [µ = 20, σ = 3] and [µ = 20, σ = 5]}.
Finally, for the exponential distribution, {λ = 5, λ = 10, λ = 15, and λ = 20}
The incentive mechanism utilized in the experiments is the GIA mechanism proposed in [14], as this is
the only one in the literature that studies area coverage considering the location of the users. The parameters
used in the evaluation are the ones included in the GIA paper: coverage radius=5, true valuation=uniform
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Figure 3.3: R2P and average displacement for each environmental variable.
[0,10], and budget=[20,260]. For more details about these parameters and the GIA algorithm, the reader is
referred to [66] and [14].
3.7.2 First Data Path: Neither Privacy nor Incentive Mechanisms
Table 3.1 presents the obtained R2S and CS when the inference mechanism is applied to the original
data, i.e., without privacy nor incentive mechanism. Note the good quality of the estimations (R2S is very
close to 1), i.e., the estimated values are very close to the real values collected by the P-Sense system, and
the coverage (33%) achieved by the system. Recall that no privacy-preserving mechanism has been applied,
therefore the locations of the participants have not been modified and the average displacement Ds is equal
to 0.
Table 3.1: The quality of the estimations (R2S) and coverage (CS) for the first data path.
Variable Temperature Relative humidity Air Quality CO2 CO Combustion gases Coverage
R2S 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.96 33.14%
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3.7.3 Second Data Path: Privacy but not Incentive Mechanism
Figure 3.3 shows the quality of the estimations, given by R2P , and the average displacement (DP )
when using the Points of Interest (Figure 3.3-a) and Random Perturbation (Figure 3.3-b) privacy-preserving
mechanisms. In the case of Figure 3.3-a, it shows the expected behavior: more points of interest mean
smaller cells and therefore lower displacements and a better quality of the estimation. As it can be seen, to
obtain a quality of information similar to the case of the first path (no location modification), a grid with
more than 7x7 cells is needed. In other words, there is a cell size that provides a good quality estimation
while still guaranteeing a good displacement (privacy). Determining this cell size for this and any other type
of PS system in an optimal way is presented in Chapter 4.
Figure 3.3-b shows the case in which a random perturbation mechanism with an exponential distribution
is applied. As it can be seen from the figure, R2P increases and the average displacement decreases with the
increase of 1/λ, the only parameter in the exponential distribution. In this case, very small perturbations
of the data are allowed if the objective is to maintain the quality of the information to a reasonable level.
In other words, this mechanism has a very large impact on the quality of the information, meaning that it
may preserve the privacy of the participants very well but it may also make the application useless, as small
displacements reduce the R2P significantly.
Figure 3.4 shows the quality of the estimations produced by several privacy-preserving mechanisms for
the six environmental variables measured by the P-Sense system according to the average displacement. As
it can be seen from the figure, all variables present a similar behavior regardless of the privacy-preserving
mechanism: different privacy mechanisms with similar average displacement produce similar quality of
information. This is an important conclusion because it means that none of the privacy-preserving schemes
studied here is actually a good scheme in systems that do not tolerate low quality of information. Other type
of schemes that somehow consider the quality of the information in their privacy-preserving algorithms are
needed.
On the other hand, several privacy-preserving mechanisms modify the coverage of the area of interest,
as shown in Table 3.2. For example, since Tessellation implements k-anonymity, meaning that k participants
report their locations to the same point, the number of reporting points decreases once Tessellation is applied.
Notice that the higher is the anonymity degree (k), the lower is the coverage. In a similar way, Points of
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Figure 3.4: R2P as a function of the average displacement for several privacy-preserving mechanisms applied
to each environmental variable.
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Table 3.2: Relationship between quality of information (R2P ), coverage (CP ) and average displacement for
the temperature.
Tessellation Points of Interest Random Perturbation
– k = 3 k = 5 k = 7 4x4 6x6 8x8 10x10 Uniform Normal Exponential
[1; 10] (µ = 5, σ = 1) (1/λ = 5)
R2P 0.47 0.31 0.16 0.76 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.82
CP (%) 12.57 8.166 5.67 11.11 20.73 28.21 30.76 33.65 33.67 33.83
Avg Disp 20.66 23.66 24.45 10.45 6.8 5.25 4.21 8.42 7.18 8.12
Interest reduces the coverage of the area of interest because participants located in the same tile report as
located at the center of the tile. Notice that, the higher is the number of points-of-interest, the higher is the
coverage. Only Random Perturbation does not modify the number of reporting locations.
In addition, Table 3.2 also presents the relationship between the quality of the estimation (R2P ), coverage
(CP ), and average displacement for the temperature variable using Tessellation, Points of Interest, and
Random Perturbation. A general tendency observed from the table is that lower average displacements
increase (as presented in Figure 3.4) the quality of the estimations R2P . Of course, this is achieved at the
expense of lower privacy for the users. Comparing Tessellation with k = 3 with Points of Interest 4x4, it
can be seen that although they both provide similar coverage, Points of Interest with lower displacements
produce significantly better quality of information. In conclusion, the impact of the average displacement
over the quality of information is significantly greater than the impact of the coverage on the quality of
information. For example, Points of Interest 6x6 and Random Perturbation (all cases) have similar average
displacement and different coverage but very similar R2P .
3.7.4 Third Data Path: Incentive but not Privacy Mechanism
The participant’s coverage radius is an important configuration parameter in the GIA mechanism. The
coverage radius defines the minimum distance between selected samples. Figure 3.5 shows the quality of
the information when the GIA mechanism is applied with different radii as a function of the budget. As the
figure shows, the quality of information and number of selected participants decrease when the coverage
radius increases. Therefore, a very large radius produces a low number of selected participants, meaning a
low quality of information due to the requirements of inference mechanisms. However, a very low radius
implies the possibility of selecting participants that are very close to each other, which spend the budget
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but provide similar (redundant) information [14]. In conclusion, selecting the appropriate radius should be
function of the needed quality of information as well as the variability of the data being measured.
On the other hand, Figure 3.6-a shows the coverage achieved by the GIA incentive mechanism (with
a radius equal to 5) when no privacy-preserving mechanism is included in the system, i.e., when the data
reported by the users is fed directly to the GIA mechanism and the average displacement (DI) is equal to
0. Note that, as expected, the coverage increases with the budget since a higher budget means more selected
participants. However, although the effect of budget increments on the coverage is constant (Figure 3.6-a),
the effect of budget increments on quality of information is not significant after some value (Figure 3.5-a).
Therefore, the optimal budget depends mostly on the desired quality of information instead of the coverage.
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows the effect of the coverage radius on the quality of information. A higher radius
means that the systems buys more distant participants, but fewer participants as well producing a lower
quality of information.
3.7.5 Fourth Data Path: Privacy and Incentive Mechanisms
Figure 3.6 also shows the coverage achieved by the system as a function of the budget but this time when
the GIA mechanism is used along with the different privacy-preserving mechanism (b, c and d). Figure 3.6-
a shows the coverage achieved by the incentive mechanism with no privacy-preserving mechanism, i.e.,
when the data reported by the users is fed directly to the GIA mechanism. This scenario, which relates to
the third data path is included here as the base case for comparison1. The other three graphs correspond
to the Random Perturbation (Figure 3.6-b)2, Tessellation (Figure 3.6-c), and Points of Interest mechanisms
(Figure 3.6-d). As it can be easily inferred from the figures, in most cases, the area of coverage is improved
as the budget available to the GIA algorithm increases, which is the expected result. However, it can also be
seen how some privacy-preserving mechanisms limit the area of coverage of the GIA algorithm, providing a
flat coverage value regardless of the budget available. This is the case of Tessellation and Points of Interest
when the number of points is small. This is due to the number of selected points since a larger k means
fewer reporting points and a smaller number of points of interest means fewer reporting points. In the case
1This same result is obtained when the encryption-based scheme is used, as encryption mechanisms do not modify the data.
2Random Perturbation location displacement in each axis: Uniform distribution:[1,10], Normal distribution: µ = 5, σ = 1,
Exponential distribution: 1/λ = 5
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Figure 3.5: R2I as a function of the budget available to the GIA algorithm using different radii.
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Figure 3.6: Coverage achieved by the GIA mechanism as a function of the budget without privacy protection
(CI ) (a) and when privacy-preserving mechanisms are present (CP+I ) (b, c and d).
of the Random Perturbation scheme, it follows the same behavior of the third data path (the base case) but
providing lower coverage values.
Figure 3.7 presents the quality of information achieved by the system for different budgets and privacy-
preserving mechanisms. In the case of Tessellation, the budget has no major effect on the quality of in-
formation because the incentive mechanism buys the anonymized locations and, when it buys one of the k
users, the others are discarded.
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Figure 3.7: Quality of information achieved by each privacy-preserving mechanism as a function of the
budget used in the GIA mechanism (R2P+I ) for temperature.
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In the case of Random Perturbation, the budget affects the coverage in a significant manner but it does
not have the same impact on the quality of information. Basically, the coverage increases with the budget.
However, the impact on the quality of information decreases when the budget is high (more than 100). In the
case of Points of Interest, the situation is similar: the budget affects the coverage but it does not affect the
quality of information much. Note that the new quality of information (R2P+I ) of Points of Interest is lower
than the original one (R2P ): even though the coverage and average displacements do not vary, the number
of selected participants varies, affecting the result. In the original case (R2P ), the average for the variable is
computed using data from participants obfuscated to the same location because the system knows the data
of all participants. In the latter case, the average is not computed because the system only knows the data of
the participants selected by the incentive GIA mechanism.
In general, when privacy and incentive mechanisms work together, the quality of the information for the
final user is affected by the budget available to the GIA mechanism and the average displacement introduced
by the privacy mechanism (DP+I). As the available budget increases, the coverage of the system increases
as well. However, some privacy mechanisms such as Tessellation and point of interest reduce the number
of reporting locations, limiting the coverage regardless of the increments in the budget. Finally, for similar
coverage, higher displacements reduce the quality of the estimations significantly. Therefore, for systems
needing a high quality of information, a high budget should be used as well as a privacy mechanism with a
low average displacement.
3.8 Remarks
This chapter presents a model to study the interactions between privacy-preserving, incentive, and in-
ference mechanisms in participatory sensing systems. A performance evaluation is carried out to evaluate
the impact of these mechanisms on the quality of information (R2), as provided by the inference system to
the final user, the average displacement (D) produced by the privacy-preserving mechanisms, as well as the
area of coverage (C) achieved by the incentive mechanism. Four different scenarios are studied in which
privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference mechanisms are either included or absent in the system.
In the case where no incentive mechanism is included in the system, the impact of privacy-preserving
mechanisms on the quality of the information to the final user depends on the average displacement that
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the privacy mechanism introduces to the real locations of the participants regardless the privacy-preserving
mechanism. Therefore, a system needing a high quality of information should avoid the use of privacy
mechanisms that introduce large displacements, such as Tessellation, and rather utilize a privacy-preserving
mechanism with low displacements, such as Points of Interest with a high number of points or Random
Perturbation. In the case where the incentive mechanism is used, the information provided to the final user
depends on the available budget, with the quality increasing with the budget. However, there is a point in
which the effect of the budget decreases the quality of the estimation. Moreover, when privacy and incentive
mechanisms work together, the budget available to the incentive mechanism and the average displacements
introduced by the privacy mechanism are the factors that affect the quality of the information to the user the
most: for systems needing a high quality of information, a high budget should be used as well as a privacy
mechanism with a low average displacement. Finally, given the good performance of Points of Interest in
terms of the achieved quality of the estimation, this mechanism is a good candidate for the environmental
application used in this work. However, although a small cell size guarantees a good quality of information,
it could compromise the participant’s privacy. A new privacy-preserving mechanism, designed to guarantee
a good quality of information as well as a good privacy protection level is presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
A HYBRID AND DYNAMIC PRIVACY-PRESERVING MECHANISM
4.1 Note to the Reader
Part of this chapter was published in the proceeding of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on
Pervasive Computing and Communications - PERCOM [2]. Appendix A includes the permissions to reuse
such work in this dissertation.
4.2 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the main conclusion is that the quality of information (R2) is inversely proportional to
the average displacement of the user with respect to their real locations regardless of the privacy-preserving
technique applied. Therefore, the challenge here is to improve R2 without affecting the privacy of the
participants.
In this chapter a new privacy-preserving mechanism for environmental sensing is introduced. The pro-
posed mechanism combines anonymization, data obfuscation, and encryption techniques to increase the
privacy of the users while improving the quality of information and the energy consumption. It includes an
algorithm that dynamically changes the cell sizes of the grid of the area of interest according to the variability
of the variable of interest being measured and chooses different privacy-preserving mechanisms depending
on the size of the cell. The mechanism is built upon the Point of Interest-based mechanism presented in [28],
for location obfuscation and data anonymization, in the case of big cells where the variability of the vari-
able of interest is low and therefore it is more important to protect the real location of the user. In the case
in which users are located inside of small cells (where users can be identified easier) a double encryption
approach is used to protect their privacy and increase the quality of the information, as the reported location
is the real location.
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Figure 4.1: System architecture.
4.3 System Model
In this section, the system architecture, the data processing model and the threat model are presented.
4.3.1 System Architecture
Figure 4.1 shows the system architecture presented in [28] and used here to implement and evaluate
the different privacy-preserving mechanisms studied in this work. The main components of the system
architecture are the following:
• Mobile nodes: They are mobile devices with enough computing power and communication capabili-
ties to perform the sensing task, run the privacy mechanism, and transmit the data to the application
server.
• Data broker: It is responsible for sending the list of configuration data (e.g., sensing task, task dura-
tion, report frequency) to mobile nodes, receiving the sensing reports, validating the mobiles’ signa-
ture, performing the initial data aggregation, and forwarding the anonymized data to the application
server.
• Application server: It is responsible for performing the inference process and providing the informa-
tion to the final users. Inference techniques are utilized by the application server in order to estimate
the variables of interest in those places where data are not available.
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Figure 4.2: Data path for the hybrid privacy-preserving mechanism.
• Privacy protection server: It is responsible for dividing the target area into cells and assigning loca-
tions to points of interest. This process is crucial in order to guarantee data privacy and a good quality
of information.
4.3.2 Data Processing Model
The data processing model consists of four components, as shown in Figure 4.2. The first component are
the sensed data, acquired and reported by the users using their mobile devices. Then, the sensed data are fed
directly to the privacy mechanism, which is in charge of applying the privacy technique and producing the
protected data. The privacy-preserved data are fed to the data verification module. In the context of PS, the
data verification consists of the process of detecting and removing spatial outliers to properly reconstruct the
variables of interest. The work presented in [1, 74] has tackled the problem of malicious users attacking the
system. The proposed mechanism implements a hybrid neighborhood-aware algorithm for outlier detection
that considers the uneven spatial density of the users, the number of malicious users, the level of conspiracy,
and the lack of accuracy and malfunctioning sensors.
The data verification approach requires an initial stage in which the local outliers generated by mal-
functioning sensors are removed. Using a local data aggregation process, the algorithm detects abnormal
correlations among the measurements in the same cell (close-by participants). The correlation among all
random variables in the same cell should follow the same behavior. Therefore, the Mahalanobis distance is
calculated for each measurement in the same cell, and consequently, the algorithm removes the measure-
ments that do not satisfy χ2d(α), the upper 100th percentile of a chi-square distribution with d degrees of
freedom. The remaining local outliers are detected by the second processing stage, a spatial outlier detection
algorithm that takes care of invalid data introduced by malicious users. The proposed method is based on the
observation that spatial outliers can be detected if their values are notably different compared to the values
from close-by locations, or nearby users. Spatial outliers are removed in this second stage using spatial data
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Figure 4.3: Example of spatial interpolation for CO2 using the original data (left), the tampered data (cen-
ter), and the reconstructed data by the verification module (right) [2].
mining techniques and a new hybrid method based on the classification of the data in neighborhoods. This
second stage utilizes the Delaunay triangulation and Gaussian Mixture Models to build neighborhoods based
on the spatial and non-spatial attributes of each location. With this neighborhood definition, it can be shown
that it is not necessary to apply accurate but computationally expensive estimators to the entire dataset to
obtain good results, as equally accurate but computationally cheaper methods can also be applied to part of
the data and obtain good results as well. The experimental results show that the algorithm performs as good
as the best estimator, effectively removing the wrong data and tampered data introduced by malicious users
while considerably reducing the execution time. The hybrid algorithm detects not only malicious users act-
ing independently, but also cooperating users trying to confuse the verification system. Figure 4.3 shows an
example of how the data verification module reconstructs the spatial interpolation for the carbon monoxide
variable after removing the tampered data.
Finally, the Inference engine receives all (good) measured data and uses Kriging to estimate the variable
of interest throughout the entire area. By comparing real data from real locations, real data from modified
locations, and estimated data using Kriging, we can determine the quality of information reported to the
final users.
4.3.3 Threat Model
In order to design a robust mechanism to protect the privacy of the participants, the threat model con-
siders internal and external adversaries. Therefore, we assume that the adversary could compromise any
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component of the system, including eavesdropping the communication channel. Thus, we assume that the
adversary may have access to the data broker, application server, or both.
4.4 The Hybrid and Dynamic Privacy-Preserving Mechanism
The proposed privacy-preserving mechanism is a combination of the Points of Interest (POI) mechanism
and the Double-encryption technique described in [28] and [22], respectively. At first, the POI mechanism
is designed to obfuscate the actual location of the participants using a set of pre-defined locations called
points of interest. Each Voronoi space defined for each POI is called a cell. Thus, before reporting to the
data broker, the mobile device changes the actual location on the record for the location of the closest POI.
The main advantage of the POI mechanism is the fact that there is no need to have a centralized entity
knowing the actual locations of the participants. Further, when the data broker receives the obfuscated data,
it computes the average of the reported data from all the participants in the same cell and reports only one
record per cell to the application server. Thus, this mechanism anonymizes the obfuscated data, adding an
extra layer of privacy to the model. The main problem of this mechanism is the noise introduced in the data
as a consequence of changing the real locations of the users.
The double encryption scheme is designed to prevent the association between the participants and their
records in the system without modifying the actual data, therefore improving the quality of information pro-
vided to the final user. In this scheme, the mobile device encrypts the sensed data (Di) using the public key
of the application server producing EncAS(Di). Keep in mind that (Di) contains the location reported by
the user and the sensor measurements. In the next step, EncAS(Di) is encrypted using the public key of the
data broker, and a double-encrypted record (EncDB(EncAS(Di))) is transmitted to the data broker. Since
the data broker and the application servers are independently managed, the double encryption mechanism
makes it more difficult for an adversary to obtain the necessary data to identify the users. When the data
broker receives the reported data, it de-encrypts those records obtaining EncAS(Di) only. Therefore, an
adversary hacking the data broker knows who sent the data but has no information about the data itself.
Finally, the data broker sends the encrypted record EncAS(Di) to the application server, where the record
is de-encrypted to obtain the actual data Di. In this case, an adversary compromising the application server
only, will know the sense data but will not know who originated it.
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The question that arises here is: when should the mobile device use the POI or the double encryption
mechanism? In order to answer this question, we need to refer the reader to the Inference stage of the system
model. In such stage, the application server applies the Kriging technique, discussed in Section 3.5.2, using
the data reported by the participants. The result of applying Kriging to the reported data is a Map of estimated
values (MRt) for round Rt, for each point in the area of interest. This map presents to the final user the
values of the variables of interest over the entire area -the pollution map in this example. Then, based on the
current map MRt , the Points of interest generator server (Section 4.3.1) runs Algorithm 1 to define the new
set of points of interest and new set of Voronoi spaces (or cells) for the next round Rt+1.
Algorithm 1 is the most important piece of the new hybrid mechanism. The main idea is to calculate
the variability of the variable of interest (e.g., CO2, temperature) after each round and change the size
of the cells according to it. If the measurements present very low variability (measurements are within a
small range of variation) inside a cell, the cell will very likely remain of the same size and the mechanism
will choose to obfuscate the data, i.e., the users will send the reports using the location of the POI of their
respective cells. On the other hand, if the variable of interest presents high variability (e.g., very different
pollution or temperature values in different zones of the same cell), the algorithm will find those zones with
different values and create new cells. If these new cells are smaller than a minimum cell size Smin, the
mechanism will choose to encrypt the data because otherwise the user might be recognized considerably
easier (the user will be confined to a smaller area). In this manner, when the mechanism obfuscates the
data, it protects the privacy of the user more and saves energy, and when it encrypts the data, it provides
more accurate information about the variable of interest but it spends more energy. These trade-offs will be
explored in more detail later.
Algorithm 1 requires the Map of estimated values (MRt), the number k of initial POIs, the maximum
number of subcells (n), and the minimum cell size (smin) as input parameters. The first step seeks to find
k cluster centroid locations (cxy) in MRt . Next, for each centroid cxyi , the algorithm computes the Voronoi
space (Vi) in MRt and the gradient of change (gi) for the variable of interest in the Voronoi space. The
minimum and the maximum gradient of change define an interval I , which is subdivided into n subintervals
I1, I2, ..., In. In the next step, each gradient of change gi is classified in the appropriate subinterval Ij and
the Voronoi space is subdivided finding j cluster centroid locations (Φxy). Note that the new list of POIxy
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Algorithm 1: Definition of Points of Interest for Rt+1
Require: MRt , k, n, smin
1: cxy ← Kmeans(MRt , k)
2: for all cxyi ∈ cxy do
3: Vi ← V oronoi(cxyi)
4: gi ← ∇MRt(Vi)
5: end for
6: POIxy ← cxy
7: gmin ← minimum(~g)
8: gmax ← maximum(~g)
9: divide [gmin; gmax] into n subinterval Ij
10: for i = 1 to k do
11: classify gi in the appropriate Ij
12: Φxy ← Kmeans(MRt(Vi), j)
13: POIxy ← POIxy ∪ Φxy
14: end for
15: for all POIxyi ∈ POIxy do
16: if Size(V oronoi(POIxyi)) < smin then
17: Mark POIxyi for encryption
18: end if
19: end for
20: return POIxy
for round Rt+1 is the union between the set cxy and each subset Φxy. Finally, the size of the cell centered
on each POIxyi is compared to the minimum cell size (smin) in order to determine which cells are too
small to guarantee a good privacy level. Thus, when located in those cells, the mobile device selects the
double encryption technique; otherwise, the mobile device selects the Points of Interest mechanism. The
time complexity of Algorithm 1 is ruled by the Kmeans algorithm which is O(nklog n) where n is the
number of points in MRt and k is the number of clusters [75].
Figure 4.4 shows how the hybrid privacy-preserving algorithm changes the shape and size of the grid
cells over time according to the sensing conditions on each round to improve the quality of the information.
Figure 4.4-a shows the initial, completely squared grid that in the first round produces a quality of informa-
tion of R2 = 0.719. Five rounds later, Figure 4.4-b shows how the shape and number of cells are changed
according to the variability of the variable being measured and now the R2 improves to 0.831. Finally,
Figure 4.4-c shows a yet different grid and cell sizes that after 10 rounds improves the quality of information
metric to R2 = 0.900.
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Figure 4.4: Example of how Algorithm 1 changes cell sizes over time.
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the performance evaluation of the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism includ-
ing the performance metrics, the experimental settings and a performance comparison with most known
privacy-preserving mechanisms.
4.5.1 Performance Metrics
The proposed model to analyze the performance of privacy-preserving mechanisms measures the quality
of information, energy consumption and privacy protection. However, given the complexity of the privacy
protection analysis, this section presents only the quality of information and energy consumption metrics.
The evaluation of the privacy protection is presented in Chapter 5.
• Quality of information: It is given by the coefficient of determination (R2), defined in Section 3.4.1,
which provides a measure of how different the real data and the estimations are. The closer R2 to 1,
the better quality of information.
• Energy consumption (E): The energy consumption of privacy-preserving mechanisms, measured in
Joules, is the second performance metric. In order to calculate this metric, three processes have
been defined to take place in the mobile device. Assuming that sensed data are stored in the mobile
device, the first process creates a packet with one or multiple records (sensing samples) that may
have been stored in memory. Once the packet is created, the mobile device applies the privacy-
preserving mechanism and modifies the data to protect the privacy of the user. Then, the packet is
transmitted to the application server. In order to measure the energy consumption of the privacy-
preserving mechanisms, the battery of the cell phone was replaced by an external power supply that
reported the voltage and actual current provided to the device every δti seconds. Then, Equation 4.1
was used to calculate the total energy used by the three processes described before.
E =
∑
i
(V ∗Ai ∗ δti) (4.1)
where V corresponds to the voltage and Ai corresponds to the current in the interval δti.
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4.5.2 Experimental Setting
The campus of the University of South Florida, in Tampa, Florida was the location for the data collection.
The area of 3.9 km2 was represented by a grid of 108x108 unit squares in this evaluation. Thus, each unit
square represents 334 m2. This mapping allows us to scale the system to cover larger areas, if needed. For
instance, an area of interest of 100 Km2 could be represented using the same grid (108x108) unit squares
but now each unit square would represent 8, 574 m2.
For comparison, in addition to the proposed hybrid mechanism, the most widely known mechanisms in
each of the three categories for the reporting process presented in Section 2.5 are also included in the eval-
uation. The experimental setup is based on the parameters found in [15] for the best Quality of Information
for each mechanism as follows:
1. Tessellation: This mechanism was implemented with k = 3. Additionally, tiles were constructed
using x-axis order, meaning that locations are ordered based on x-axis location and the tiles are as big
as necessary to contain k participants depending on its value.
2. Points of Interest: This mechanism was implemented dividing the area of interest using a grid of 5x5
cells.
3. Random Perturbation: This mechanism was implemented using a uniform distribution {[1,10]} for
the displacement of the actual locations in each axis.
4. Hybrid: This mechanism was implemented dividing the area of interest using a grid of 5x5 cells for
the first round. The parameters k and smin for Algorithm 1 were set to 25 clusters and 200 unit squares
(66, 800 m2) respectively.
4.5.3 Quality of Information Results
The main objective of the proposed mechanism is to improve R2 without affecting the privacy of the
participants. Figure 4.5 shows the quality of information achieved by the different mechanisms for the Rel-
ative Humidity (RH) variable measured by P-Sense at USF. In the case of Random Perturbation, the quality
of information is better because of the lower average displacement compared to the POI mechanism. On
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Figure 4.5: Quality of information reached by the Points of Interest (POI), the Hybrid (POI + Encryption),
Random Perturbation (Uniform distribution [1, 10]) and the Tessellation (K = 3) mechanisms.
the other hand, Tessellation has the worst quality of information because of the larger average displacement.
Finally, in the case of the hybrid mechanism, a significant improvement for R2 is obtained because the aver-
age displacement is decreased. In the first round the hybrid technique uses the 5x5 grid but for the following
rounds, the hybrid mechanism is able to detect regions with high variability of the variable of interest and
break those cells into smaller cells, thus reducing the average displacement in those regions. Not only that,
in those cells smaller than Smin, the mechanism makes the mobile user to encrypt the data, which contains
the real location of the user, which improves the quality of information even further.
4.5.4 Energy-Consumption Results
The experiments to measure the energy consumption of the different mechanisms consisted of the trans-
mission of 100 P-sense records (i.e., location, timestamp, CO2, CO, air quality, temperature, RH factor,
and combustion gases concentration) using Wi-Fi and 3G Networks. Each record is anonymized, obfus-
cated, or encrypted depending on the selected privacy-preserving mechanism. We used a Hewlett Packard
E3631A 0-6V, 5A/0-(+-) 25 V, 1A Triple Output DC Power Supply to provide power to the cell phone, a
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Figure 4.6: Energy consumption comparison between the Points of Interest (POI), Random Perturbation
(Rnd Pert), Tessellation (Tslltn), and the Double Encryption (Encrypt) mechanisms.
Samsung SPH-D720 Nexus S with an Android OS Version 4.0.3, and a Motorola Droid Xtreme MB810
with an Android OS Version 2.2.1.
4.5.4.1 Energy Consumption of Each Privacy Mechanism
Figure 4.6 shows the comparison between the different privacy-preserving mechanisms using the Sam-
sung SPH-D720 transmitting each P-Sense record as a packet through the Wi-Fi network. Obfuscation-based
techniques, such as the POI and Random Perturbation, present the lowest energy consumption, as they do
not require additional transmissions. Tessellation [21] has a higher energy consumption because it needs to
establish a connection with the anonymization infrastructure in order to obtain the tile information before
sending the report to the data broker. Finally, the double encryption mechanism is shown to be the worst in
energy consumption because it needs to establish a SSL channel, which requires the transmission of the key,
the double-encryption process, and the transmission of the data. Note that in Figure 4.6 does not show the
hybrid mechanism because the hybrid mechanism has different levels of energy consumption depending on
the percentage of records encrypted.
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Table 4.1: Processing time for double encryption (milliseconds).
Number Packet First SSL Packet Packet Total
of records creation encryption connection transmission time time
10 54.89 6.76 899.83 5.80 967.27 9672.72
25 60.64 9.64 830.64 6.83 907.75 3630.99
50 101.38 19.79 823.34 18.07 962.59 1925.17
100 171.76 33.11 762.46 27.10 994.43 994.43
4.5.4.2 Impact of the Establishment of a SSL Channel
An intuitive manner to decrease the energy consumption is to transmit several data records using the
same SSL channel. In order to characterize the impact of the establishment of a SSL channel, the 100 P-
sense records were reported in set of 10, 25, 50 and 100 records per packet. Therefore, the number of sent
packets were 10, 4, 2 and 1 respectively. In the case of double encryption method, the privacy mechanism
was divided into four stages: packet creation, first encryption, SSL-channel, and packet transmission through
the SSL channel. Table 4.1 shows the processing time associated to the double encryption mechanism using
the Motorola Droid Xtreme MB810 through the Wi-Fi network. Notice that the longest time is associated
to the establishment of the SSL-channel due the certificate exchange process. Therefore, a good strategy
to improve the energy consumption for encryption method is to decrease the number of times in which the
establishment of a new SSL connection is needed meaning the maintenance as long as possible the SSL
channel between the mobile node and the data broker.
4.5.4.3 Energy Consumption of the Hybrid Mechanism
As explained before, a record will be encrypted or obfuscated depending on the cell size. Figure 4.7
shows the energy consumption of the hybrid mechanism for different percentages of data encrypted using
Wi-Fi and 3G networks. A 0% means that all records were obfuscated while a 100% means that all records
were encrypted. Notice that the larger the percentage of records encrypted, the larger is the difference in
energy consumption between Wi-Fi and 3G networks. Comparing Figures 4.6 and 4.7, it can be seen how
the energy consumption of the hybrid mechanism is lower than Tessellation when the number of records
encrypted is equal to 0 and equal to the Encryption mechanism when the percentage of records encrypted is
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Figure 4.7: Energy consumption comparison using Wi-Fi and 3G for the hybrid mechanism.
100% (case Wi-Fi). For other values, the energy consumption of the hybrid mechanism increases linearly
with the percentage of records encrypted.
4.6 Remarks
This chapter presents a hybrid privacy-preserving mechanism that combines anonymization, data ob-
fuscation, and encryption techniques to increase the privacy of the users while improving the quality of
information and the energy consumption. The proposed hybrid mechanism includes an algorithm that dy-
namically changes the cell sizes of the grid of the area of interest according to the variability of the variable
of interest being measured and chooses different privacy-preserving mechanisms depending on the size of
the cell. Encryption techniques are used in small cells (where users can be identified easier) to protect the
privacy of the users while increasing the quality of the information, as the reported location is the real loca-
tion. Anonymization and data obfuscation techniques are otherwise used in bigger cells where the variability
of the variable of interest is low and therefore it is more important to protect the real location of the user.
In addition, this chapter presents an evaluation of the proposed approach and other privacy-preserving
mechanisms using a real PS system for air pollution monitoring. The experiments show the better perfor-
mance of the proposed hybrid mechanism in terms of quality of information to the final user. The energy
consumption associated with privacy-preserving algorithms is characterized in this chapter showing the
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better performance of the obfuscation-based mechanisms. The proposed mechanism improves the energy
consumption of double-encryption mechanism which produces the better quality of information. Therefore,
the proposed algorithm is tunable in order to produce a good quality of information and a lower energy
consumption at the same time.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
5.1 Note to the Reader
Part of this chapter was published in the proceeding of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on
Pervasive Computing and Communications - PERCOM [2]. Appendix A includes the permissions to reuse
such work in this dissertation.
5.2 Introduction
As defined in Chapter 2, if the adversary is limited to capture a single report transmitted by a participant,
the system may be subject to snapshot attacks. On the other hand, if the adversary has access to the collected
data (historical data from the repository server) and is able to establish historical correlations between dif-
ferent reports, the attack is called historical [30]. In addition, according to the system architecture presented
in Section 4.3.1, an adversary may have access to three different types of data sets: the data set available in
the data broker, the data set available in the application server, or both.
This chapter presents a privacy protection analysis for the snapshot and the historical case assuming that,
in each case, the adversary has access to the data broker, application server, or both. It is worth noticing
that not all privacy-preserving mechanisms use the same components presented in the system architecture.
For example, in the case of anonymization schemes, the anonymizer has the actual data reported from the
participants, which is equivalent to the data set available in the data broker.
5.3 The Snapshot Case
The question for the evaluation of the privacy protection in this case is: What is the probability that
an adversary could identify the location where the participant was located at when he/she performed the
73
sensing? In order to answer this question, this section presents the performance evaluation of the proposed
mechanism from the privacy point of view. It includes a description of the performance metrics and the ex-
perimental setting utilized in the evaluation as well as the performance comparison with the most important
privacy-preserving mechanisms available in the literature.
5.3.1 Evaluation Model
The Probability to be located (Ploc) is proposed to measure the privacy protection level offered, by the
available privacy-preserving mechanisms, to participants. In order to calculate Ploc in the snapshot case, the
following definitions are introduced:
• Round (Rt): It is a time slot for performing the sensing task. Each round corresponds to a time interval
in which participants sense and report data to the system. When the current round Rt is ended, the
inference mechanism estimates the value of the variable of interest in each point of the area of interest,
and a new round Rt+1 starts.
• Data record (Di): It is the i tuple of the form (Lxy, Rt, ~Bi) reported by a participant, where Lxy is
the reported location, Rt is the current round, and ~Bi is a vector containing the sensed values. Thus,
Di does not contain any data that identifies the participant.
• Map of estimated values (MRt): It is a bi-dimensional matrix where Mxy corresponds to the values
estimated by the inference mechanism for the variable of interest at location (x, y) in round Rt.
• Cell location function (Cell(Di)): Given a reported record Di, this function returns the cell (i.e.,
Voronoi space Vj centered at Lxy) in which the record was anonymized/obfuscated from, and the size
of the cell SVj .
Cell(Di)⇒ (Vj , SVj ) (5.1)
• Location estimator function (Loc(MRt , Di, P erc)): Given a map of estimated values MRt , a per-
centile Perc, and the i data recordDi in roundRt, this function returns an area A of size SA in which
the adversary concludes, with certainty PA, that the issuer was located at when she generated record
74
Di.
Loc(MRt , Di, P erc)⇒ (A,SA, PA) (5.2)
A good quality of information means that the estimated value for the variable of interest is very close
to the reported one. Therefore, in order to produce (A,SA, PA), this function generates a distribution
of the differences between the reported value for the variable of interest inDi and each estimated value
in the cell where Di is located. Then, the function selects the Perc percentile of such distribution.
• Average area where the adversary concluded that the participant was located (S¯A): The function
Loc(MRt , Di) is proposed in order to estimate the average area S¯A where the data record Di was
generated. Given a map of estimated values MRt and the data record Di in round Rt, this function
returns the average size of the estimated area S¯A in which the adversary concluded that the issuer of
record Di was located at when she generated Di. In order to compute S¯A, Equation (5.2) is evaluated
using Di and different values for Perc (e.g., 5%, 10%, ..., 100%) generating a set of estimated areas
{(A1, SA1 , PA1), (A2, SA2 , PA2), ..., (Ak, SAk , PAk)}. Then, Equation 5.3 is used to calculate S¯A.
S¯A = Loc(MRt , Di) =
∑k
j=1
(SAj ∗ PAj ) (5.3)
• Probability to be located (Ploc): Given an estimate of the average area where the issuer of record Di
was located at, this function computes the probability of finding the actual location of the issuer of the
data record Di in round Rt.
Ploc(Loc(MRt , Di))⇒ 1−
S¯A
ST
(5.4)
where ST is the size of the total area of interest. Notice that Ploc increases as S¯A decreases because
a larger S¯A means a larger area in which Di was located by the adversary (i.e., a lower probability of
finding the actual location). Thus, a lower S¯A increases the probability of finding the actual location
in which Di was generated.
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5.3.2 Experiments and Results
The experiments aim to measure Ploc when the adversary gains access to the data broker, the application
server, or both. The settings for these experiments are the same defined in Section 4.5.2. The area of
3.9 km2 was represented by a grid of 108x108 unit squares in this evaluation. Thus, each unit square
represents 334 m2. In addition, the tessellation, random perturbation and point-of-interest mechanisms
were implemented using the same parameters defined in Section 4.5.2.
5.3.2.1 Adversary Has Access to the Data Broker
This scenario is equivalent to an adversary compromising the anonymizing infrastructure in the case
of k-anonymity techniques. Thus, an adversary compromising these components have access to the par-
ticipant’s actual data (e.g., actual location) in the case of Tessellation. On the other hand, in the case of
Random Perturbation and the Points of Interest techniques, the adversary has access to the obfuscated data
only. Finally, in the case of the hybrid mechanism, the adversary gains access to a portion of the reported
data, which has been obfuscated in the mobile device because the other portion has been encrypted and it is
not accessible to the adversary in this server.
The first row in Table 5.1 (Ploc at DB) shows the Probability to be located in this scenario based on
Equation 5.4. In the case of Tessellation, Ploc is 1 because an adversary compromising the anonymization
infrastructure has access to the actual data containing the actual location of the participants. In the case of
Random Perturbation, Ploc is 0.979 because of the low average displacement needed in order to guarantee
a good quality of information [15]. On the other hand, the Points of Interest mechanism has a Ploc equal to
0.983 because the data broker has the obfuscated records not the actual ones. Finally, the hybrid mechanism
has a Ploc of 0.985 for the data records available at the data broker; however, these records only represent
70.2% of all records because the other ones were encrypted and therefore not available in the data broker.
As a result, Ploc = 0.692 for the hybrid algorithm.
5.3.2.2 Adversary Has Access to the Application Server
In this scenario, the adversary compromises the application server, which is the component where
the inference process is performed. In the case of Tessellation, the adversary does not have access to the
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Table 5.1: Probability to be located (Ploc) at the data broker (DB), at the application server (AS) and at both
(DB + AS).
Tessellation Random Points of Hybrid
Pert Interest
Ploc at DB 1 0.979 0.983 0.692
Ploc at AS 0.317 0.979 0.400 0.628
Ploc at DB + AS 1 0.979 0.983 0.989
actual data but the anonymized data. In the case of Random Perturbation, the adversary has access to the
obfuscated data only. In the case of Points of Interest and the hybrid mechanisms, the adversary has access
to the anonymized data by the data broker as well as the actual data reported through the encryption path.
Please recall that the amount of encrypted data in the application server depends on the size of the cells;
mobile users who are located in cells smaller than Smin are the only ones encrypting their records.
The second row in Table 5.1 (Ploc at AS) presents Ploc for each privacy mechanism. In the case of
Random Perturbation, Ploc is the same as the one presented on the first line (Ploc at DB) because the data
broker and application server have both the same records. In the case of Tessellation with k = 3 and sixty
users, as used for the experiments, the number of anonymized records is 13 of the actual ones. Therefore,
the average tile size is 120 of the total area, meaning that Ploc = 0.95 for the anonymized records sent by
the data broker. Since each anonymized record represents 3 participant records, Ploc for each actual record
is 13 of 0.95 which is 0.317. In the case of the Points of Interest mechanism, the application server has
access to the anonymized records sent by the data broker. With a 5x5 grid, Ploc for each anonymized record
is 1 − 125 = 0.96. These experiments achieve a k = 2.4 (i.e., number of actual records represented by
each anonymized record), producing a Ploc = 0.962.4 = 0.4 for each reported record from mobile devices.
Finally, in the case of the hybrid mechanism, an adversary compromising the application server will have
access to the encrypted records plus the anonymized records sent by the data broker. Thus, Ploc is the sum
of Ploc for the encrypted records plus Ploc for the anonymized records sent by the data broker. In the case
of the encrypted records, Ploc = 1 for each one of the records because they contain the exact location
of the users; however, these records only represent 29.8% of the total number of records. On the other
hand, Ploc for the anonymized records is 0.961, which is applied to the remaining 70.2% of the records.
However, since each anonymized record represents 2.04 of the original records (2.04 is the average number
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of obfuscated/anonymized users in each cell), Ploc = 0.298 + 0.961 ∗ 0.702/2.04 = 0.628, as shown in
Table 5.1.
5.3.2.3 Adversary Has Access to the Data Broker and Application Server
This is the worst case scenario because it assumes that the adversary has compromised both, the data
broker and the application server. The third row in Table 5.1 (Ploc at DB + AS) presents the Ploc in this case.
In the case of Tessellation, Ploc = 1 because the adversary has access to the actual locations from the data
broker. In the case of Random Perturbation, Ploc is the same presented above because the data in the data
broker and application server are the same. Therefore, in this case, it does not make any difference if an
adversary compromises the data broker, the application server, or both. In the case of Points of Interest, Ploc
is the same as in the case where the data broker is compromised because it is the source of more detailed
data compared to the application server. Finally, in the case of the hybrid mechanism, Ploc is the sum of Ploc
at the data broker Ploc = 0.692 and Ploc of the encrypted records 0.298 at the application server because an
adversary compromising both components will have access to all records in the system; therefore the final
Ploc is 0.989.
From Table 5.1 and Figure 4.5, we can conclude that the hybrid mechanism provides the best balance
between privacy protection and quality of information. The key for the better performance of the hybrid
mechanism is the distribution of the records in the data broker and the application server since it avoids an
adversary to get access to all the records when compromising one server. If the adversary compromises
the data broker, he has access to the obfuscated records but not the encrypted ones, and viceversa with the
application server. In addition, the obfuscation technique increases the difficulty for an adversary to identify
the location where the records were generated because the records contain the modified location instead of
the actual one.
5.3.3 Trade-offs
Table 5.2 presents the percentage of encrypted records (% Encrypted), the percentage of obfuscated
records (% POI), the probability to be located at the data broker (Ploc at DB), application server (Ploc at AS)
and both (Ploc at DB + AS), as well as the energy consumption for transmitting 100 P-sense records using
78
Table 5.2: Performance comparison varying the minimum cell size (Smin).
Smin 0 100 200 400
% Encrypted 0% 1.3% 29.8% 62.3%
% POI 100% 98.7% 70.2% 37.7%
Ploc at DB 0.987 0.973 0.692 0.369
Ploc at AS 0.480 0.485 0.628 0.752
Ploc at DB + AS 0.987 0.987 0.989 0.992
Wi-Fi (Joules) 2.43 3.08 15.83 30.47
3G (Joules) 8.35 10.35 53.60 103.08
Wi-Fi and 3G networks as the minimum cell size parameter Smin is varied. In addition, Figure 5.1 shows
the trend of the quality of information depending on the minimum cell size Smin. Notice that lower values
of Smin mean lower percentages of encrypted records, which is translated into lower energy consumption as
well as lower quality of information and higher Ploc at the data broker. On the other hand, higher values of
Smin mean higher percentages of encrypted records, which translate into higher energy consumption, higher
quality of information, and a higher Ploc at the application server.
Figure 5.1: Quality of information based on the minimum cell size (Smin).
In conclusion, it is clear that Smin has an important effect on the privacy, quality of information, and
energy consumption of the users. Therefore, this parameter can be changed by network administrators to
better suit their needs and the needs of the users. The results show the better performance of the hybrid
79
algorithm to protect the participants’ privacy when compared with the other privacy-preserving approaches
for the snapshot case.
5.4 The Historical Case
One application of PS systems is to support the urban and transportation planning process inferring the
most popular travel routes in a city and understanding the human travel behavior [76–79]. Therefore, PS
systems have generated significant interest in the collection of spatio-temporal data for moving objects [80,
81]. However, the availability of such data at a centralized location raises concerns regarding the privacy of
mobile device clients since an adversary could use a trajectory-estimation method over such data in order to
compromise the users’ privacy [82–84].
The case of an adversary having access to the collected data (historical data from the repository server)
allows him to identify the places visited by the participants and their mobility patterns through the recon-
struction of their trajectories. For instance, trip destinations can reveal information about a person’s health
(e.g., frequent visits to a medical doctor or a hospital), lifestyle, net worth, or political associations. There-
fore, the analysis of the historical case is an important component in the evaluation of privacy-preserving
mechanisms. The question in this case is How much of the actual trajectory can be reconstructed by an
adversary accessing a set of records?
Suppose an adversary has access to a set of reported records, each record contains a location, a time-
stamp and a value for the variable of interest. In order to reconstruct the trajectory of the participant, the
adversary needs to determine which records have been issued by that particular participant. Recall that
the adversary has access to privacy-protected data, then he may have access to modified or non-modified
data based on the privacy-preserving mechanism applied in the system. In the case of a PS system using
an non-attribute-modification mechanism, the adversary has access to the actual location, and he might use
a traditional tracking algorithm in order to reconstruct the participant’s trajectory [80]. In the case of an
attribute-modification mechanism, the adversary does not have access to actual but a modified location,
therefore, he needs to estimate the location where each record was generated as well as the records that
belongs to the same trajectory. Since the hybrid privacy-preserving mechanism utilizes anonymization,
obfuscation and encryption, if the adversary compromises the data broker, he has access to modified data
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due the anonymization and obfuscation approach. On the other hand, if the adversary compromises the
application server, he has access to the actual data that has been decrypted and stored in this server.
This section proposes a model to assess the privacy protection provided by privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms for the historical case along with a literature review of the tracking algorithms that an adversary might
use in order to reconstruct the trajectories of the participants. In addition, this section presents an evaluation
of the proposed hybrid algorithm for the historical case when the adversary compromises the data broker,
the application server, or both.
5.4.1 Evaluation Model
The Probability to be followed (Pbf ) and the Percentage of discovered segments (Pseg) are proposed to
measure the privacy protection level offered by the available privacy-preserving mechanisms when historical
attacks are taken into consideration. In order to calculate Pbf the following definitions are introduced:
• Roads on the area of interest (MRoads): It is a graph G = {V,E} where V corresponds to the
set of road intersection in the area of interest, and E corresponds to the set of actual roads between
intersections.
• Set of maps of estimated values (ME[t;m]): Let ME[t;m] be the set of maps with estimated values
(MRt) from round Rt to round Rm (i.e., ME[t;m] = {MRt ,MRt+1 , ..,MRm}).
• Set of records in a given round (St): Let St be a set of data records in round Rt, i.e., St = {(Lxy, Rt,
~Bi)
1, (Lxy, Rt, ~Bi)
2, ..., (Lxy, Rt, ~Bi)
N} where (Lxy, Rt, ~Bi)k corresponds to the data record Dk at
round Rt defined in Section 5.3.1.
• Set of records during a time interval (H[t;m]): Let H be a set of St’s, i.e., H[t;m] = {St, ...Sm}, where
St corresponds to a set of data records in round Rt and St+1 corresponds to a set of data records at
time Rt+1.
• Road estimation function (RoadEst(ME[t;m], H[t;m],MRoads, ISk)): Given a set of maps of es-
timated values ME[t,m], from round Rt to round Rm, a set of records H[t;m], the roads of the
area of interest (MRoads) and a given participant (ISk), this function estimates a set of roads
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(RoadsTrackISk) where the trajectory of the participant ISk is likely to be located.
RoadEst(ME[t;m], H[t;m],MRoads, ISk)→ RoadsTrackISk (5.5)
As presented in Chapter 2, privacy-protection mechanisms for the reporting process are classified
as attribute modification or non-attribute modification approaches. Therefore, the adversary might
have access to different data based on the type of privacy-preserving mechanism. In the case of
attribute modification approaches, the system does not receive the actual location of the partici-
pant but her modified location. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the location of the partic-
ipant in each round Rt. Therefore, given a map of estimated values (MRt), a percentile Perc,
the data record Di in round Rt and the map of roads MRoads, an intermediate function called
SegRoadEst(MRt , P erc,Di,MRoads) returns the segments SegRoadsi on MRoads in which
the adversary concludes that the issuer was located at when she generated record Di.
SegRoadEst(MRt , P erc,Di,MRoads)⇒ SegRoadsi (5.6)
In order to produce SegRoadsi, this function generates a distribution of the differences between the
reported value in Di and each estimated value for the variable of interest (e.g., CO2) in the cell in
which Di is located. Then the function selects the percentile Perc in such distribution, estimates an
area A which it is intercepted with MRoads and estimates SegRoadsi. Finally, RoadEst(ME[t;m],
H[t;m],MRoads, ISi) concatenates the segment roads SegRoadsi in order to produce the complete
set RoadsTrackISk .
On the other hand, in the case of the non-attribute modification approaches, the system does have
access to the actual location of the participant. Therefore, the adversary aims to reconstruct the tra-
jectory followed by the participant. In general, the trajectory estimation problem is to find a set of N
trajectories given a history H spanning P timestamps of exactly N objects [80]. Each trajectory T k
is defined as follows:
T k = {(x, y)k1, (x, y)k2, ..., (x, y)kP } (5.7)
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where k = {1, 2, ..., N} and (x, y)kt corresponds to the location of the object k at round Rt.
Therefore, in the case of non-attribute modification approaches, the set RoadsTrackISk corresponds
to the estimated trajectory T k for the participant ISk.
• Percentage of discovered segments (Pseg): Given the set of road segments RoadsTrackISk produced
by the set of data records issued by the same participant ISk, Pseg defines the percentage of the actual
trajectory T ISk that is identified in RoadsTrackISk .
Pseg =
|seg(T ISk) ∈ RoadsTrackISk |
|T ISk | (5.8)
where seg(T ISk) ∈ RoadsTrackISk corresponds to the segments of the trajectory T ISk in the road
segments RoadsTrackISk .
• Probability to be followed (Pbf ): Given the set of road segments RoadsTrackISk produced by the
set of data records issued by the same issuer ISk, Pbf defines the probability that the actual trajectory
T ISk is identified in RoadsTrackISk .
Pbf =
|seg(T ISk) ∈ RoadsTrackISk |
|RoadsTrackISk | (5.9)
where seg(T ISk) ∈ RoadsTrackISk corresponds to the segments of the trajectory T ISk in the road
segments RoadsTrackISk .
5.4.2 Tracking Algorithms
The objective of target tracking is to collect sensor data from a field of view, containing one or more
potential targets of interest, and to divide them into tracks that are produced by the same target. Usually, the
system must track multiple targets, then multiple target tracking (MTT) is the most important technique for
the identification of trajectories [85]. MTT is a well-studied technique in the field of radar technology for
trajectory identification (e.g., air traffic control and ocean surveillance) through the association of measure-
ments with the appropriate object trajectory [80]. Therefore, an adversary accessing the reported location
might use these tracking methods in order to reconstruct the participants’ actual trajectory and compromise
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their privacy. The MTT methods can be classified into five major categories: linear interpolation, near-
est neighbor, joint probabilistic association, multiple hypotheses tracking and history-based route inference
systems.
5.4.2.1 Linear Approach
These techniques are very popular to identify trajectories in moving objects databases [86]. The main
idea is to join each pair of consecutive samples using an interpolating line. The main assumption for these
techniques is that users move at a constant speed along the straight lines [87].
5.4.2.2 Nearest-Neighbor Approach
Nearest-neighbor (NN) approaches aim to find the most likely assignment of input observations to ex-
isting tracks through the minimization of the distance between each predicted and the actual location [88].
The main assumption made by NN approaches is that an observation is produced by a single target, meaning
that a track can be updated by at most one observation and an observation can be assigned to only one track.
Therefore, only tracks that do not share any observation can appear in the same assignment solution.
Usually, NN approaches are based on an assignment matrix A = [d2ij ] where dij is the normalized
distance between the predicted next value for observation i and the actual observation j. According to [88],
d2ij is given by
d2ij = e
T
ij(k)S
−1
i (k)eij(k) (5.10)
where eij is the difference between the measured and predicted values and Si(k) is the covariance matrix
of eij . Therefore, the observation-to-track assignment is made by maximizing the number of assignments
while reducing the summed distance Σd2ij .
NN techniques can be classified as Suboptimal Nearest Neighbor (SNN) and Global Nearest Neighbor
(GNN) approaches. The SSN approach performs the observation-to-track assignment based on the following
two rules:
1. Make the assignment observation-to-track pair for the minimum value in A.
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2. Remove the row and column fromA corresponding to the observation-to-track pair assignment in (1),
and repeat (1) for the reduced matrix.
The major drawback of the SSN approach is that it does not guarantee finding the optimal solution.
On the other hand, in GNN approaches, the global term is used to refer to the fact that the assignment is
made considering all possible associations. Usually, GNN approaches use the Munkres algorithm [89, 90]
to minimizes the Σd2ij in order to obtain the global observation-to-track assignments.
5.4.2.3 Probabilistic Data Association
Probabilistic Data Association (PDA) is one of the most often used algorithms for data association in
target tracking [91–93]. These type of approaches use all measurements in the validation gate (window) of
the track being updated and approximate the probability distribution function of the target state after each
update with a Gaussian probability distribution [94]. Finally, PDA assumes that only one of the candidates
is a target, and the rest are false alarms.
On the other hand, rather than deriving algorithms based on an assumption of track existence, Integrated
Probabilistic Data Association (IPDA) starts from expressions which treat track existence as an event with
an associated probability [95]. Then, the IPDA algorithm does not assume target existence and provides
data association formulated together with the expressions for probability of target existence in a recursive
manner [96].
Finally, in the Joint Probabilistic Data Association (JPDA) approach, the joint posterior association
probabilities are computed for multiple targets in Poisson clutter [97]. According to [88], the probability of
track i being associated with observation j, is the sum of the probabilities of all joint events in which track
i is associated with observation j, which is expressed as:
pij(k) =
∑
θ(k)
P [θ(k)|Y k]ω[θ(k)] (5.11)
where Y k is the set of all observations received up to the current scan k, ωij [θ(k)] = 1 if track i is associated
with observation j in the event θ(k), and ωij [θ(k)] = 0 otherwise.
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5.4.2.4 Multiple Hypothesis Tracking
Multiple Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) methods do not associate each observation with a single track.
Their key idea is to maintain multiple hypotheses for which joint probabilities are calculated recursively
when new measurements are received [80]. Reid’s algorithm, the most representative of MHT methods, is
designed to initiate tracks, account for false or missing reports, and process the sets of dependent reports
in a cluttered environment [98]. In Reid’s algorithm, once a new observation is received, probabilities are
calculated for the following hypotheses: the observation belongs to the trajectory of a previously known
target, a new target, or the observation is a false report. Although Reid’s algorithm produces high quality
results, its computational complexity grows exponentially with the number of observations.
Another algorithm utilized for tracking people in MHT is the Rao-Blackwellised particle filter (RBPF)
[99]. The tracking problem for RBPF is defined as follows:
1. Let xk := {x1k, x2k, ..., xmk } be the current positions of the m people being tracked.
2. Let zk be the the current observation and z1:k be the complete sequence of observations up to time k.
3. The association between object tracks xik and the observations are given by assignment matrices θˆk
and θ˜k. For instance, θˆk(i, j) is one if θˆk assigns anonymous observation θˆ
j
k to object x
i
k, and zero
otherwise.
The objective of RBPF is to estimate the posterior probability over both states xk and θˆ1:k. The joint
posterior can be factorized by the conditioning state xk on the assignment θˆ1:k:
p(xk, θˆ1:k | zˆ1:k) = p(xk | θˆ1:k, zˆ1:k) p(θˆ1:k | zˆ1:k) (5.12)
The key idea of RBPF is to compute Equation 5.12 by sampling assignment from p(θˆ1:k | zˆ1:k) and then
computing the state xk conditioned on each sample.
86
5.4.2.5 History Based Route Inference Systems
In urban environments, History Based Route Inference Systems (HRIS) are designed to infer possible
routes given a low-sampling-rate trajectory 1. The main assumptions for this approach is the fact that when
people travel, they often plan the route based on the experience of their own or others, rather than choosing
a path randomly [100]. Therefore, the HRIS approach takes advantage of available information from the
historical trajectories deriving the travel pattern from historical data and incorporating them into the route
inference process.
Figure 5.2: Street system for the historical analysis.
5.4.3 Experiments and Results
This section presents the experiments and results on privacy protection for the historical case. Since the
hybrid privacy-preserving mechanism offers the best performance for the snapshot case, the experiments in
this section aim to measure the probability to be followed (Pbf ) and the percentage of discovered segments
1Defined as a GPS trajectory in which the time interval ∆T between two consecutive samples is relatively high (e.g., > 2min)
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(Pseg) for the hybrid privacy-preserving mechanism when the adversary has access to a set of records and is
able to establish historical correlations between them.
The area of 3.9 km2 was represented by a grid of 108x108 unit squares in this evaluation. Thus, each
unit square represents 334 m2. In addition, in order to perform the historical analysis, a metropolitan circuit
of 20 × 20 streets was deployed on the area of interest as shown in Figure 5.2. Then, 60 trajectories were
defined for each experiment. Each trajectory consists of the shortest path between a starting and an ending
point randomly selected on the street circuit. The parameters k and Smin for Algorithm 1 were set to 25
clusters and 200 unit squares (66, 800 m2), respectively.
5.4.3.1 Adversary Has Access to the Data Broker
An adversary that compromises the data broker gains access to the reported data that have been obfus-
cated in the mobile device because the other portion has been encrypted and it is available in the application
server. Since the reported location in each message corresponds to a cell, the adversary does not have access
to the actual location and therefore the traditional tracking algorithms cannot be used to perform the privacy
protection analysis, as they depend on the actual locations.
Algorithm 2: Tracking algorithm using cells (Trackingcells)
Require: ME[t;m],MRoads,Hk[t;m], P erc,maxSpeed
1: for i = t to m do
2: Ci ← cell where Hki was generated
3: RCi ← Ci ∩MRoads
4: FPi ← the frontier points of RCi
5: end for
6: Let Rtrack be the list identified points
7: for i = t+ 1 to m do
8: cR← the roads that connect cells Ci−1 to Ci
9: nIP ← points on cR reachable from BPi using maxSpeed
10: bnIP ← points on nIP in Perc
11: Rtrack ← Rtrack ∪ bnIP
12: end for
13: fnIP ← points on RCm reachable from FPm−1
14: fnIP ← points on nIP in Perc
15: Rtrack ← Rtrack ∪ fnIP
16: return Rtrack
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A new tracking algorithm is proposed for this case. Algorithm 2 is designed to estimate the roads where
the participant was located when she generated each report. The main assumption for this analysis is that the
adversary has eavesdropped the communication channel between the participant and the data broker. This
is the worst case scenario for the participant’s privacy because the adversary has the ability to identify the
participant that generated each report. Thus, the adversary can make historical correlations between reports.
Recall that the adversary has access to a set of records where each one has an obfuscated location, a
time-stamp (i.e., round) and a sensed value. First, Algorithm 2 identifies the cell where the report was
generated. Then, the algorithm avoids the unreachable points due time and speed constrains for each cell
(i.e., there is a maximum distance that the participant can travel due to the time and maximum speed in the
area of interest). In order to find the reachable points, Algorithm 2 selects only the reachable points in the
previous round Rt−1 from each border point, defined as a location at the border and at one road in the cell,
in the current round Rt. The idea is to identify the location where the participant should be located in the
previous round in order to reach the current cell. Figure 5.3 shows an example for two rounds (Rt−1 and
Rt) including the border points for Rt as well as the reachable and unreachable points in Rt−1 from Rt. In
the example, the participant should be located in the reachable points in round Rt−1 in order to reach the
next cell in round Rt. Finally, given the fact that a high R2 means a close estimated value to the actual one,
the algorithm selects the locations, on each cell, that have a estimated value very similar to the actual one
based on the percentile condition.
Figure 5.3: Example of point identification through the time.
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Figure 5.4: Tracking example using Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 requires the set of maps of estimated values (ME[t;m]) which is publicly available, the map
of roads (MRoads), the set of reports by the k participant (Hk[t;m]), the percentile (i.e., defined in Section 5.6)
and the maximum speed in the area of interest (maxSpeed). The algorithm estimates the roads (RCi) in
each cell (Ci) where the participant was located when reporting the measurements to the system. Then,
the algorithm finds the border points on each road RCi. For each report, the algorithm finds the reachable
points from the border point (BPi) in the previous cell (Ci−1) that meet the percentile classification (Perc).
Finally, the algorithm finds the reachable points in the last cell (Cm) from the previous cell (Cm−1). The
time complexity for Algorithm 2 is given by O(m × n) where n is the size of the ME[t;m] and m is the
number of rounds.
The experiment conditions define two scenarios for Algorithm 2, as shown in Figure 5.4. In the figure,
the dotted lines correspond to the estimated roads in which the participant could have been located when
reporting to the system, while the x lines corresponds to the actual trajectory for three rounds (Rt, Rt+1
and Rt+2). The first scenario defines cells with low overlapping between rounds. In this case, Algorithm 2
is very accurate because it accurately discovers segments connecting the consecutive cells. The second
scenario defines cells with considerable overlapping. In this case, the Algorithm 2 is not very accurate
because most of the cell is reachable from the cell of the previous round.
Figure 5.5 shows the behavior of the Pbf and Pseg as a function of the percentile used in Algorithm 2.
As shown, the greater the percentile, the greater Pseg and the lower Pbf . This behavior is given by the fact
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Figure 5.5: Pbf and Pseg for the hybrid algorithm with Smin = 200.
that a greater percentile relaxes the condition of closeness to the actual value, therefore, more points are
discovered increasing the value of Pseg. However, such relaxation means points that are not in the actual
trajectory, decreasing the value of Pbf .
5.4.3.2 Adversary Has Access to the Application Server
In this scenario, the adversary has access to the actual points once decrypted on the application server.
Therefore, traditional tracking algorithms can be used in order perform the privacy protection analysis.
According to [87], the global nearest neighbor (GNN) approach has the best performance for trajectory
reconstruction when the actual points are available. Therefore, the GNN algorithm is used here to perform
the privacy protection analysis when the application server is compromised by the adversary. However,
given the double encryption scheme, the adversary does not have access to the participant’s identity.
In order to calculate Pbf and Pseg, the GNN algorithm implemented in [101] is used in this case. Such
implementation uses the Munkres algorithm to obtain the global observation-to-track assignments that min-
imizes the Σd2ij [90]. The experiments shows that it has a Pbf = 0.811 and a Psec = 0.803 when all data
are encrypted (i.e., using the actual locations). In the case of the hybrid algorithm with Smin = 200, the
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algorithm achieves a Pbf = 0.783 and Pseg = 0.326 meaning that, on average, 32.6% of each trajectory is
identified with an accuracy equal to 78.3%.
5.4.3.3 Adversary Has Access to the Data Broker and Application Server
In the case of the hybrid mechanism, an adversary that compromises the data broker and the application
server gains access to the portion of the obfuscated data as well as the portion of the encrypted data. The
main difference between those sets of records is given by the fact that if the adversary eavesdrops the com-
munication channel between the participant and the data broker, he has access to the participant’s identity;
while the records in the application server do not have data about the participant’s identity. Therefore, the
adversary might use the GNN algorithm in order to reconstruct the participants’ trajectories based on the
encrypted data in the application server and use Algorithm 2 in order to reconstruct trajectories based on
records available in the data broker. Then, using those sets of estimated trajectories, the adversary could
conciliate them in order to improve the estimation of all trajectories, as presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Tracking algorithm using cells and encrypted points
Require: ME[t;m],MRoads,H[t;m], P erc,maxSpeed,ENCH[t:m]
1: TracksAS ← GNN(ME[t;m], ENC −H[t;m])
2: Trackscells ← ∅
3: for k = 1 to m do
4: Hk[t;m] ← find(k,H[t;m])
5: Trackscells ← Trackcells ∪ Trackingcells(ME[t;m],MRoads,Hk[t;m], P erc)
6: THk ← time holes in Hk[t;m]
7: end for
8: TracksDB ← every Trackscells with THk = 0
9: TracksDB+AS ← ∅
10: for each T k ∈ {Trackscells − TracksDB} do
11: T kenc ← find track in TracksGNN that match with T k
12: if |T kenc == 1| then
13: CTK ← TK ∪ T kenc
14: TracksAS ← TracksAS − T kenc
15: TracksDB+AS ← TracksDB+AS ∪ CTK
16: end if
17: end for
18: return TracksAS ∪ TracksDB ∪ TracksDB+AS
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Algorithm 3 is proposed to improve the trajectory reconstruction process. It requires the set of maps
of estimated values (ME[t;m]) which is publicly available, the map of roads (MRoads), the set of reports
available in the data broker (H[t;m]), the percentile (i.e., defined in Section 5.6), the maximum speed in the
area of interest (maxSpeed) and the set of records ENCH[t:m] available in the application server. First,
the Algorithm runs the GNN algorithm in order to estimate the participants’ trajectories (TracksAS) using
records available in the application server. Then, Algorithm 2 is used to estimate trajectories (Trackscells)
for each Hk[t;m] (i.e., historical records reported by user k) in the record set H[t;m]. The set of trajectories
Trackscells has two types of trajectories: trajectories with reports in all rounds and trajectories with missing
records in some rounds. The trajectories with records in all rounds are collected into the set TracksDB (i.e.,
trajectories with only obfuscated points using the point-of-interest mechanism). Then, for each trajectory
T k in the set {Trackscells − TracksDB}, Algorithm 3 finds those trajectories in the set TracksAS that
fill the time gaps and have reachable points from T k. In order to complete T k, Algorithm 3 requires that
only one track, in TracksAS , meets the T k requirements. In addition, every trajectory in TracksAS used
to complete a T k trajectory is removed from the TracksAS set. Finally, the algorithm returns a set of
trajectories TracksAS estimated using the encrypted records, the set of trajectories TracksDB estimated
using only data available in the data broker, and a set of trajectories TrackDB+AS estimated using data
available in the data broker and the application server. The time complexity for Algorithm 3 is ruled by the
Munkres algorithm, used to estimate trajectories using the encrypted points, and it is O(n3) where n is the
number of points to be followed [102].
Algorithm 3 produces a set of estimated trajectories divided as: TracksAS = 31.56%, TracksDB =
39.55% and TracksDB+AS = 28.89%. The set of TracksAS has a Pseg = 0.298 and Pbf = 0.789.
Figure 5.6 shows the behavior of the Pbf and Pseg as a function of the percentile used in Algorithm 3. It is
worth in noticing that Algorithm 3 improves the Pseg of estimated trajectories when compared with the case
in which only the application server is compromised as well as improve the Pbf of estimated trajectories
when compared with the case in which the data broker is compromised.
These results confirm the intuitive assumption that compromising both servers results in a better estima-
tion of trajectories for the adversary. However, these results show the robustness of the proposed algorithm
because in the worst case scenario, in which the data broker and application server are compromised, the
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Figure 5.6: Pseg and Pbf when the data broker and application server are compromised (Smin = 200).
adversary has a lower probability to estimate the actual participants’ trajectory when compared with the
double encryption scheme.
5.4.4 Trade-offs
Figure 5.7 shows the behavior of Pseg and Pbf when the data broker is compromised by the adversary.
First, the lower Smin, the higher Pseg because more points have been obfuscated using POI and Algorithm 2
is able to discover more points of the actual trajectory. On the other hand, Pbf has a stable behavior regard-
less of the Smin value.
Table 5.3: Comparison for Pseg and Pbf varying the minimum cell size (Smin).
Smin 50 200 400
% Encrypted 0% 40.7% 69.7%
% POI 100% 59.3% 30.3%
Pseg at AS 0 0.326 0.478
Pbf at AS 0 0.783 0.791
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Figure 5.7: Tradeoff Pbf and Pseg for Smin = {50, 200, 400} when the data broker is compromised.
In addition, Table 5.3 presents the trade-offs for Pseg and Pbf when the application server is compro-
mised by the adversary. The higher Smin, the higher Pseg because there are more encrypted locations and
the GNN algorithm has more points to estimate the actual trajectories. On the other hand, Pbf has a similar
value for Smin = {200, 400} meaning a good accuracy for the algorithm. In the case of Smin = 50, the
percentage of encrypted points is 0, therefore the Pseg and Pbf are equal to 0. However, in this latter case,
the system produces a lower quality of information as shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.8 presents Pseg and Pbf as a function of the Smin value and the percentile. As shown in the
figure, the higher Smin, the higher Pbf because more actual points are available and a higher accuracy is
achieved. On the other hand, the higher Smin, the lower Pseg because there are more encrypted points and
less obfuscated points in the data broker.
In conclusion, the results show the good level of privacy protection provided by the hybrid algorithm
when the historical case is taken into consideration. The Smin parameter determines the level of Pseg
and Pbf which are inversely proportional given that the scenario with a high Pseg (i.e., the adversary has
compromised the data broker) produces a low Pbf . On the other hand, the scenario with a high Pbf (i.e., the
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Figure 5.8: Tradeoff Pbf and Pseg for Smin = {200, 400} when the data broker and application server are
compromised.
adversary has compromised the application server) produces a low Pseg. The worst case is reached in the
scenario in which the data broker and the application server have been compromised. In such scenario, a
high Smin means that the adversary reaches more accuracy to discover the participant’s trajectory. However,
the average Pseg is around 55% of the actual trajectory with an accuracy equal to 65%.
5.5 Remarks
This chapter presents the evaluation of privacy protection of the proposed hybrid algorithm for the
snapshot and the historical case. An evaluation model is presented for each case as well as set of experiments
when an adversary compromises the data broker, application server or both. The results shows the better
performance of the hybrid algorithm when compared to other algorithms for the snapshot case. In addition,
the hybrid algorithm achieves a good protection level when the historical case is taken into consideration
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because the records division in the data broker and application server decrease the effectiveness of tracking
algorithms to estimate the actual participants’ trajectories.
In conclusion, the Smin parameter governs the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving mech-
anism in terms of quality of information to the final user, the energy consumption and privacy protection
level. The lower Smin, the lower the quality of information, the lower the energy consumption and the lower
privacy protection in the data broker for both the snapshot and historical case. The higher Smin, the higher
the quality of information and the higher the privacy protection in the data broker, but the lower privacy
protection in the application server. Therefore, the balance in the quality of information, privacy protection
and energy consumption is achieved when the Smin reaches a medium value.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the most relevant findings and results of this dissertation and includes a number
of ideas for future research in privacy-preserving mechanisms for participatory sensing.
6.1 Summary of Results and Findings
Chapter 2 presents the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving mechanisms for PS systems. After a general
description of participatory sensing systems and its main components, it includes the most important issues
to consider in the design, implementation, and evaluation of privacy-preserving mechanisms. The most
important contribution of Chapter 2 is a three level taxonomy to classify privacy-preserving mechanisms
along with the description of the most relevant studies found in the literature and the qualitative evaluation
based on the design issues. This evaluation allows the reader to choose the most appropriate mechanism to
her system.
Chapter 3 presents a model to study the interactions between privacy-preserving, incentive, and inference
mechanisms in participatory sensing systems. A performance evaluation is carried out to evaluate the impact
of these mechanisms on the quality of information (R2), as provided by the inference system to the final user,
as well as the area of coverage (C) achieved by the incentive mechanism. In the case where no incentive
mechanism is included in the system, the impact of privacy-preserving mechanisms on the quality of the
information to the final user depends on the average displacement that the privacy mechanism introduces to
the real locations of the participants. Therefore, a system needing a high quality of information should avoid
the use of privacy mechanisms that introduce large displacements, such as Tessellation, and rather utilize
a privacy-preserving mechanism with low displacements, such as Points of Interest with a high number of
points or Random Perturbation. In the case where the incentive mechanism is used, the information provided
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to the final user depends on the available budget, with the quality increasing with the budget. However, there
is a point in which the effect of the budget decreases the quality of the estimation. Finally, when privacy
and incentive mechanisms work together, the budget available to the incentive mechanism and the average
displacements introduced by the privacy mechanism are the factors that affect the quality of the information
to the user the most: for systems needing a high quality of estimation, a high budget should be used as well
as a privacy mechanism with a low average displacement.
Chapter 4 presents a new privacy-preserving mechanism designed to improve the quality of the infor-
mation provided to final users while guaranteeing a good protection level and low-energy consumption. The
mechanism combines anonymization, data obfuscation, and encryption techniques to increase the quality of
information and privacy protection without increasing the energy consumption in a significant manner. The
proposed algorithm dynamically changes the cell sizes of the grid of the area of interest according to the
variability of the variable of interest being measured and chooses different privacy-preserving mechanisms
depending on the size of the cell. In small cells, where users can be identified easier, the algorithm uses
encryption techniques to protect the privacy of the users and increase the quality of the information, as the
reported location is the real location. On the other hand, anonymization and data obfuscation techniques are
used in bigger cells where the variability of the variable of interest is low and therefore it is more important
to protect the real location (privacy) of the user.
A new model for the evaluation of privacy-preserving mechanisms is proposed in this dissertation. The
model proposes the measurement of the quality of information to final users using the coefficient of determi-
nation (R2) , the energy consumption in Joules and the privacy protection using the probability to be located
(Ploc), when the adversary has access to a single data record (i.e., snapshot case), and the probability to be
followed (Pbf ) when the adversary has access to a set of records and can establish historical correlations be-
tween them (i.e., historical case). The proposed hybrid approach and other privacy-preserving mechanisms
were evaluated using a real PS system for air pollution monitoring based on the new evaluation model.
The experiments show a better performance of the proposed hybrid mechanism and the existing trade-offs
in terms of privacy, quality of information to the final user, and energy consumption. The combination of
privacy-preserving mechanisms increases the quality of information since decreases the average displace-
ment, decreases the energy consumption when compared to encryption based techniques and improves the
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privacy protection because the decentralization of data decreases the Ploc and Pbf for the snapshot and
historical cases respectively.
6.2 Future Work
This section presents some of the most important open problems and challenges in privacy-preserving
mechanisms for participatory sensing.
• Privacy-preserving mechanisms for the tasking process: The main purpose of privacy-preserving
mechanisms for the tasking process is to guarantee that users can be tasked anonymously [12]. Al-
though several models have been presented, as described in Section 2.4, some methods such as the
anonymous authentication and the direct tasking without revealing location lack the capability of pre-
dicting the number of users visiting a particular region. Others, such as the ones based on attribute-
based authentication, allow an adversary with additional knowledge to track the user to certain groups,
allowing the identification of a particular participant in a group. Therefore, privacy mechanisms for
the tasking process offer good privacy protection or guarantee good data quality but not both at the
same time. In order to produce a good quality of information, an incentive mechanism needs to select
the appropriated samples based on the location of the participant. However, the privacy-preserving
mechanisms could modify participant’s location in order to protect her privacy during the tasking pro-
cess. The challenge therefore is how to protect the participants privacy while guaranteeing a good
data quality during the tasking process, specially when it is used along with an incentive mechanism.
• Privacy-preserving mechanisms for the reporting process: As stated before, each privacy mechanism
for participatory sensing is designed to protect a specific type of data. For instance, there are privacy-
preserving mechanisms tailored to protect the locations of the participants while others protect their
physiological data (e.g., heart and breathing rate). However, there are no many privacy-preserving
mechanisms that consider multiple types of data, so a challenge is how to protect the participants
privacy when several data types are involved. A proposed solution is presented in [103] where the
authors describe a mechanism for activity recognition involving physiological signals and the loca-
tions of the participants. In that work, based on selective sensing, the participants define which data
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they will reveal to the system. However, given the mix of several sensed data, the configuration of
the system is highly confusing for the participants who do not understand the implications of their
choices, leading them to leave the default configuration [104].
• Privacy protection for mobility patterns: Since people tends to follow similar mobility patterns (e.g.,
during the morning most people travel towards down town), an adversary might use this external infor-
mation in order to improve the estimation of the participant’s trajectories. Usually, data suppression
is applied in order to protect the participant’s privacy but, as explained before, data suppression de-
creases the quality of information [62]. Therefore, the challenge is to protect the participant’s privacy
against an adversary with external information.
• Interaction between incentive, privacy-preserving and inference mechanisms: Incentive mechanisms
are very important for PS systems. However, these mechanisms are insensitive about the protection
of the participants’ privacy. Therefore, a new research direction might be the integration of incentive
and privacy-preserving mechanisms. For instance, since the proposed hybrid mechanism divides the
area of interest into cells in order to improve the quality of information, then the challenge is how to
buy samples in the each of the cells without revealing the actual location of the participant. For bigger
cells the participant may reveal the location of the cell where she is located, but she should not reveal
her location when located in smaller cells.
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